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Abstract 
The growth and spread of FDI during the 20
th
 century has been described as a 
significant economic-geographic development. Norwegian FDI has been increasing 
since the 1980s, but the large scale of it is a new phenomenon. Singapore is now the 
third most important host country for Norwegian FDI. This thesis is a study of 
Norwegian FDI in Singapore, and the research question is: Which economic and 
political factors do Norwegian companies regard as important when investing abroad, 
and to what degree have they been deciding in the process of choosing Singapore as 
the investment location? 
 
The analysis is based on two types of information: statistics on Norwegian FDI to 
Singapore in the period 1998 to 2006 and interview data. The investment decisions of 
three Norwegian companies are analyzed. The selected companies are Pareto 
Securities, Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) and Jotun, operating in the financial 
services sector, the solar energy industry and the chemicals industry, respectively.  
 
The results indicate that both economic and political factors influence the investment 
decision of the companies. The most decisive economic factors were access to new 
markets, access to skilled labor and cost savings. In addition, political factors such as 
control of corruption and an efficient bureaucracy seemed to be of great significance. 
The statistics show that the largest sectors of Norwegian FDI in Singapore are oil and 
gas, shipping, production of paper and telecommunications. It is suggested that 
Singapore functions as a gateway for Norwegian FDI to Asia.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Economic Globalization and FDI 
Economic globalization can be defined as “the increasing cross-border 
interdependence and integration of production and market for goods, services, and 
capital” (Benito et al. 2002: 61). One element of economic globalization is the increase 
in foreign direct investment (FDI). Dicken (2000: 275) regards the growth and spread 
of FDI and other forms of international economic involvement as one of the most 
significant economic-geographic developments of the twentieth century. How is FDI 
different from other kinds of investment?  The UN definition is:”…FDI refers to an 
investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the 
economy of the investor. Further, in cases of FDI, the investor´s purpose is to gain an 
effective voice in the management of the enterprise” (UNCTAD 2009a). An effective 
voice is considered at least 10 percent equity ownership. The keyword is control; 
investments made purely for financial reasons, such as purchasing of stocks/shares 
below the 10 percent limit, are portfolio investments. Portfolio investments are not 
made to gain control of an enterprise.  
 
The process of international investment has taken place through the medium of 
transnational corporations (TNCs). “A transnational corporation is a firm that has the 
power to coordinate and control operations in more than one country, even if it does 
not own them” (Dicken 2007: 106)1. There are about 790,000 TNCs in the world today 
with a total of 790,000 foreign affiliates (WIR 2008).The size of these TNCs‟ FDI is 
one way to measure their activity, but collaborative ventures and alliances are 
becoming increasingly common (Dicken 2007: 36). There are two kinds of FDI: 
horizontal and vertical (Schatz and Venables 2000: 129-132). FDI is classified as 
horizontal (HFDI) when companies decide to establish a new production plant abroad, 
duplicating the whole production process. HFDI often substitutes for trade since 
exports are replaced with local production (Brainard 1997). Vertical FDI (VFDI) is to 
                                              
1
 The terms multinational enterprise (MNE) and multinational corporation (MNC) are also common, but the 
concept transnational corporation will be used in this thesis. 
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invest in production that enables the firm to move only a part of the production process 
abroad. This division of the production chain is usually trade creating since production 
takes place in several countries (Hummels et al. 2001). An FDI project can also be 
described as a greenfield investment; which involves the creation of an entirely new 
plant (Navaretti et al. 2004: 299).  
 
The spread of FDI accelerated after the Second World War and since the mid 1980s 
FDI has grown much faster than trade (Dicken 2007: 37-38). Between 1985 and 1990, 
the trend growth of FDI and exports diverged, and FDI stocks grew at an average 
annual rate of 25%, FDI flows grew at 18% and world exports at 12.7%
2
. With the 
exception of a few recession periods, the strong growth in FDI has continued at a fast 
pace. Dicken (2007: 38) argues that this might indicate that the primary mechanism of 
interconnectedness within the global economy has shifted from trade to FDI. 
Economic competition in today‟s world is global; firms are competing with other firms 
from across the world. In such a competitive environment, instead of asking why 
transnationalize, Dicken (2007: 108) rather asks; why not transnationalize?  
 
1.2 Economic Globalization and Norwegian FDI 
Norwegian FDI is not an entirely new phenomenon, but the increasing scale of it is a 
recent development (Hveem et al. 2008a). If one thinks of economic globalization as a 
puzzle, Norwegian FDI is one small piece of the big picture. Norway used to be a net 
importer of inward FDI; the country received more FDI than it invested abroad. 
Norwegian outward FDI started to grow during the late 1980s. From 1995 onwards, 
outward FDI stock became larger than inward FDI stock. The Norwegian outward FDI 
stock has continued to increase; from NOK 240 billion in 1998 to NOK 754 billion in 
2006 (SSB 2009a). Norway has become a home country for sizeable amounts of FDI – 
but which countries are the hosts of Norwegian outward FDI? According to the latest 
                                              
2
 FDI flows comprise capital provided by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise, or capital received from 
an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. That is, FDI flows refer to those cross-border transactions which 
qualify as direct investments recorded during a reference period (year, quarter, month). FDI stock is the value of 
the share of capital and reserves attributable to the parent enterprise; the stocks represent the value of the stock of 
direct investments held at the end of the reference period (OECD 2008, WIR 2008).  
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statistics from 2006, the most important host countries are Sweden, USA, Singapore, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain and Belgium/Luxembourg, 
respectively (SSB 2009a). 
 
The developed countries are still the largest recipients of both inward and outward FDI 
– reflected by the top eight recipients of Norwegian FDI (Dicken 2007: 39). The only 
„surprise‟ is Singapore as a newly industrialized country (NIC). From a mere NOK 2.6 
billion in 1998, Singapore had a Norwegian FDI stock of NOK 61.4 billion in 2006 
(SSB 2009a). Asia receives 15% of Norwegian FDI and Singapore is now the host of 
about 8% of this, over half of Norwegian FDI to the region. Some or even a large part 
of this capital may be channeled to other countries since Singapore often functions as 
an offshore financial center for companies (Dicken 2007: 406). However, it is a 
challenging task to identify the ultimate host country for an increasingly large number 
of FDI transactions every year. I will come back to this theme in the analysis. At the 
other hand, there must be some reason for Norwegian TNCs to invest in and „channel‟ 
such a large amount of capital to Singapore. 
 
In this thesis, I investigate the case of Norwegian FDI in Singapore. I am focusing on 
the relationship between firm and host country. Host countries are both containers of 
distinctive business practices and regulators of business activity – states are therefore 
one of the most important ways in which location-specific factors are packaged 
(Dicken 2007: 234). I want to explore which factors are important for Norwegian 
companies when they decide to invest in Singapore, and, what the companies‟ main 
motives for investing are. The research question is: 
 
Which economic and political factors do Norwegian companies regard as important 
when investing abroad, and to what degree have they been deciding in the process of 
choosing Singapore as the investment location?  
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1.3 Theory and Empirical Results  
To answer the research question, the theory considers the nature and motivations of 
firms, and also the interrelations between firms and states. This way, it is possible to 
investigate both the significance of the economic factors and the significance of the 
political factors in attracting FDI. Political factors, and especially the role of 
institutions and organizations, are critical to the relative success of economies (North 
1990: 69). Dunning‟s (1988) eclectic paradigm is used as a framework to explain 
Norwegian firms‟ investments abroad3. There are three conditions that lead to FDI: 
ownership-specific advantages, location-specific advantages and internalization 
advantages. The focus will be on the location-specific advantages which are divided 
into two main motives: market and asset oriented investments (Dicken 2007). The 
asset oriented investments are further explored by including new motives such as 
agglomerations and clusters (Krugman 1998, Porter 2000). The role of the government 
and the bureaucracy are discussed in a separate part of the theory chapter, emphasizing 
the importance of policy towards FDI, industrial policy and the role of an efficient 
bureaucracy.  
 
On the basis of the theory, twelve hypotheses are suggested; economic factors such as 
a large market size, a skilled work force, low wages, access to suppliers and a well 
developed infrastructure will have a positive effect on FDI. A highly unionized work 
force and a low level of investment will have a negative influence on FDI. In addition, 
economic institutions in the form of a stable political system characterized by control 
of corruption, rule of law and property rights, and an efficient bureaucracy will have a 
positive effect. Last, general policy and sector specific policy are assessed; low 
corporate tax and other government cost-reducing incentives, sector-specific industrial 
policy and clusters will attract FDI.  
 
Three companies and their investment decisions were analyzed: Pareto Securities, 
Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) and Jotun. Both Pareto and REC decided to 
                                              
3
 In this thesis, firm, company, enterprise and corporation will be used interchangeably. 
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invest in Singapore, while Jotun decided to invest in Malaysia instead. In addition, the 
companies belong to different sectors and industries; Pareto is in the services sector 
providing financial counseling while Jotun and REC are both manufacturers, but in the 
chemicals industry and the solar energy industry, respectively. To be able to 
understand what kind of location advantages Singapore has to offer, it is useful to 
compare the country to Malaysia. Over the last few years Malaysia has become more 
of a competitor to Singapore in terms of attracting FDI. The data analyzed in the thesis 
support the hypotheses, except for the union system and the level of investment where 
the results are inconclusive. The decisive motive for investing was found to be market 
access in the case of Pareto and Jotun. REC‟s motive on the other hand was asset 
oriented; access to skilled labor and cost savings were regarded as the most decisive 
factors for this company. In addition, it is proposed that Singapore functions as a 
gateway to Asia for Norwegian FDI.  
 
1.4 Structure  
After the theory discussion, two background chapters about Norwegian FDI and 
Singapore lay the foundation for the analysis. Norway as a home country and 
Singapore as a host country both influence Norwegian FDI (see comparison in 
Appendix 1). Norwegian companies invest in specific sectors and industries, for 
example shipping and oil, and in certain countries. Additionally, the Singapore 
economy has been transformed since the 1960s: from labor abundant and capital 
scarce to labor scarce and capital abundant (Siow Yue 2005). The industry changed 
from labor-intensive manufacturing to capital- and technology-intensive 
manufacturing and high value added services. Today Singapore is an export 
manufacturing base, the country hosts regional headquarters of many transnational 
companies (TNCs), the city is a financial center and a trading, transportation and 
telecommunications center.  
 
The design and method of the thesis are discussed in chapter five. The main emphasis 
is on case design and the corresponding choice of method. The first methodological 
discussion revolves around the selection of companies. Subsequently, the interview 
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method is assessed including the major strengths and weaknesses. The interviews were 
supplemented with a questionnaire that is presented briefly before going through the 
quantitative data and method. The quantitative data was collected by Statistics Norway 
(SSB) in the period 1998-2006.  
 
The analysis starts with the statistical results regarding the share of Norwegian FDI 
stocks in Singapore during the period 1998-2006. It is followed by a presentation of 
the three companies before analyzing the questionnaire and the interviews according to 
four categories: economic factors, economic institutions, general policy and sector-
specific policy. The results are reviewed at the end of the analysis. The conclusion 
provides a brief summary. I start with the firm-level and try to widen the perspective 
by bringing it up on a state-level. At the end, some possibilities for future research are 
suggested.  
 
 
  
7 
 
2. THEORY 
The first part of this chapter is an explanation of some of the basic structures of the 
economy – firms and institutions and why they exist. The next sections are centered on 
firm-level theory about FDI. Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm is presented before focusing 
on localization factors and the motives for investing abroad. There are two main 
motives: market oriented and asset oriented investments, where „new‟ motives are 
associated with agglomerations and clusters. After exploring the motives, Dunning‟s 
concept of the investment development path is introduced to emphasize the role of the 
government and the bureaucracy in attracting FDI. Hypotheses are introduced in 
connection with the relevant theory. At the end, the theory is operationalized into four 
categories: economic factors, economic institutions, general policy and sector-specific 
policy (see Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). Table 2.2 provides a summary of the 12 
hypotheses derived from the different theories. The four categories and the 12 
hypotheses will later guide the analysis.  
 
2.1 The Firm: Cost and Profit 
The most fundamental „rule‟ of capitalism is the drive for profit (Dicken 2007: 107). 
Business firms may have other motives, such as becoming the industry leader or 
increasing their market share, but in the end, economists argue that the most important 
is the maximization of expected profits. The economic definition of profit, π, is 
revenue minus cost (Varian 2006: 335): 
π = r – c 
Cost includes all of the factors of production used by the firm valued at market price. 
These are also referred to as opportunity costs, what labor or production factors would 
be worth on the competitive market.  
 
According to Coase (1937: 388-389), the distinguishing mark of a firm is its 
supersession of the price mechanism. The price mechanism coordinates the economic 
system, or in other words, the market. Outside the firm production is coordinated 
through a series of exchange transactions on the market, but within a firm, the same 
market transactions are eliminated. The market structure is substituted by the 
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entrepreneur who directs production. The coordination of the various factors of 
production, or the degree of vertical integration, varies greatly between industries and 
firms (Coase 1937: 389).  
 
In the article, Coase (1937: 390-393) is explaining why a firm emerges in a specialized 
exchange economy. The main reason is the costs connected to using the price 
mechanism. The existence of the firm reduces these transaction or information costs. 
One example is the costs that arise when negotiating and concluding a contract; these 
can be avoided to a certain degree by the integration of factors of production. Another 
is the difficulty of knowing what a supplier will do, especially for long term contracts.  
These reasons explain why organizations such as firms exist in a market economy.  
Coase (1937: 393) states that:  “A firm, therefore, consists of the system of 
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent 
on an entrepreneur”. 
 
On the other hand, there are also costs involved when internalizing activities. A large 
firm reduces transaction costs, but why isn‟t there only one big company that produces 
everything?  A firm will stop expanding when the costs of organizing an extra 
transaction within the firm is equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by 
exchange on the open market, or by another firm (Coase 1937: 394-395). Varian 
(2006: 338) calls this the boundaries of the firm, the choice between „make or buy‟ 
everything from physical goods to services. What is typically inside the firm changes 
with technology, and today many firms tend to outsource parts of their operations.  
 
2.2 Institutions and Transaction Costs  
As seen above, transaction costs are central to understanding whether exchange takes 
place on the market or within a firm. However, transaction costs are not exogenous. 
They are affected by institutions. According to North (1990: 3), “Institutions are the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction.” Institutions can be both formal and informal, and they 
affect the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production (North 
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1990: 4-5). North (1990: 68) agrees with Coase (1937) that vertical integration offers a 
partial solution to transaction costs. On the other hand, firms may reduce transaction 
costs to a certain degree, but institutions exist because of transaction costs. “The 
costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consists of the 
costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of 
protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements” (North 1990: 27). The total 
production cost to a firm is the sum of transformation costs and transaction costs 
(North 1990: 28). The institutional framework therefore plays a major role in the 
performance of an economy; some institutional constraints increase efficiency and 
some decrease efficiency. Nevertheless, institutions are critical to the relative success 
of economies (North 1990: 69).  
 
In a hypothetical world where markets are perfectly competitive and there are no 
increasing returns to institutions, institutions do not matter (North 1990: 95, 108). 
However, neither of these assumptions is empirically true. First, information is costly 
and asymmetrically held by the parties to the exchange. This creates transaction costs. 
Also, regardless of how institutions are developed, they result in some degree of 
imperfection of the markets. Second, institutions matters because of increasing returns. 
Both institutions and economic production are marked by increasing returns where 
four self-reinforcing mechanisms apply (Pierson 2000: 254): 
1. Large set-up or fixed costs – creates a high pay-off for further investments in a 
given technology or for further development of an already established 
institution.  
2. Learning effects – continuing use because of gained knowledge in the operation 
of complex systems or institutions.  
3. Coordination effects – occur when the benefits an individual receives from an 
activity increase as others adopt the same activity, or when organizations 
cooperate.  
4. Adaptive expectations – this derives from the self-fulfilling character of 
expectations, both in the economy and in institutions.  
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Due to increasing returns and imperfect markets, institutions have consequences for 
economic analysis (North 1990: 110-112). First, institutional constraints provide 
incentive structures; there is interaction between the rules of the game and the 
behavior of the actors. Formal constraints like tax structure, regulations and statute 
laws shape the policies of firms, trade unions and other actors. Second, institutions 
make it possible to explore the implications of the costly and imperfect processing of 
information for the behaviors of the actors. Third, the polity and economy are 
interlinked and the institutional constraints define the exchange relationship between 
the two. An integration of political and economic aspects is therefore often necessary, 
also for analysts studying the behavior of economic actors, like firms. 
 
2.3 Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm 
The eclectic paradigm, as John H. Dunning (1980) has named it, is an attempt to 
synthesize different theories into one framework. The paradigm seeks to understand 
and explain the „where‟, „why‟ and „how‟ of international production. The purpose is 
to explain the international production of all firms from a particular country or group 
of countries (Dunning 2001: 186). Dunning has many forerunners, including Stephen 
Hymer‟s (1971) contribution concerning corporate hierarchy, FDI and unequal 
distribution and Raymond Vernon‟s (1966) work about market size and product cycle.  
 
An enterprise‟s capability of supplying a domestic market depends on possessing 
certain assets, both tangible and intangible assets such as natural resources and 
knowledge (Dunning 1988: 19). The assets are available to all firms, but can be 
location-specific in origin and use, and they also include government legislation and 
policies. According to North (1990), institutions like government legislation affect the 
relative success of economies, and this will be discussed in the section concerning the 
role of government and bureaucracy. Three types of factors or conditions that lead to 
FDI are identified in the paradigm (Dunning 1980, Dicken 2007: 108-110): 
1. Ownership-specific advantages (O) – a firm must possess certain advantages 
that are not possessed by other firms or nationalities, advantages that are 
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internal and owned by a firm. Some examples are types of knowledge, 
technology, marketing and human skills.  
2. Location-specific factors (L) – these factors make it more profitable for the firm 
to exploit its assets in foreign locations; the assets also have to be used at these 
locations. Some of these factors are markets, resources, production costs, 
political conditions and cultural/linguistic attributes. The significance will vary 
according to the type of activity involved.  
3. Internalization (I) – the advantages must be exploited by the firm itself, and it 
will therefore internalize the use of its ownership-specific advantages. An 
uncertain environment will lead to more internalization, especially in the case 
of knowledge. If a company uses a large amount of capital on research and 
development, it has a strong incentive to retain the technology for in-house use 
by setting up its own production facilities and exploiting the technological 
advantage directly.  
 
The two first factors may explain which firms will supply a certain market and 
whether it will do so by exporting, or by local production. However, they cannot 
explain why the firm itself chooses to do it and not sell or lease the ownership 
advantages to another firm. To explain this, one has to bring in the third factor, the 
internalization of ownership-specific advantages. The greater these advantages are, the 
greater the inducement to internalize them, and the greater the likelihood for the firm 
to engage in international production (Dunning 1980: 9-11). Dunning does not agree 
with Coase that reduction of transaction costs is the only reason for internalization of 
production (Dunning 1988: 6). Other reasons might be to improve a company‟s value-
adding capabilities, and/or exploit a monopolistic position. According to Dunning 
(1988: 33), internalization is the distinctiveness of the eclectic paradigm. 
 
L-specific endowments are external to a firm while O-specific endowments are 
internal. An imperfect market, or market failure, is a prerequisite to strategies based on 
O advantages. In an imperfect market it is possible to exploit differences. Dunning 
(1988: 45) distinguishes between two kinds of market imperfections which influence 
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the location decisions of TNCs; structural and transactional. Transactional market 
failure relates directly to transaction costs, while structural market failure includes 
those arising from some kinds of government intervention that may encourage or 
discourage FDI.  Both of these market failures may affect the choice of location since 
some transactional market failures are country-specific. The two activities that offer 
the greatest gains from internalization are the production and marketing of intangible 
assets and those of essential location-specific resources, areas where TNCs are 
particularly involved. L advantages are important; a country‟s resource endowments 
have a large impact on resource-based investment, but the economic environment also 
matters for investment decisions (Dunning 1988: 141-145). In the economic 
environment, there are three factors of crucial importance:  
(a) the level of economic development like education and infrastructure 
(b) the structure of the economy, pattern and size 
(c) and the role of national governments in fashioning political and economic 
systems, attitudes, entrepreneurship and business strategy  
 
Briefly put, Dunning‟s (1988: 26) hypothesis says that firms will engage in 
international production if and when three conditions are satisfied:  
1. The firm possesses O advantages which are exclusive or specific to the firm, at 
least for a period of time.  
2. If (1) is satisfied, it is beneficial for the firm to use these advantages itself 
through an extension of the existing value added chains or new ones; these are 
called internalization advantages.  
3. If (1) and (2) are satisfied, it must be in the firm‟s interest to use the O and I 
advantages in combination with some factor inputs outside its home country. If 
not, the foreign markets would be served by export; these are the locational (L) 
advantages of countries.   
 
To test Dunning‟s hypothesis, it is necessary to distinguish between three structural 
variables which influence enterprises‟ OLI configuration; those that are specific to 
particular countries, to particular types of activities or industries and to particular firms 
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or enterprises. All of these three levels need to be taken into consideration. The 
configuration of the OLI advantages is likely to be context-specific, and it will 
therefore also be country-specific differences in the ownership advantages of firms 
from different countries (Dunning 2001: 176). Further, Dunning (2001) has argued 
that the paradigm works best when regarded as a framework for analyzing the 
determinants of international production, rather than a predictive theory of different 
TNCs. In line with Dunning, it is the determinants I am analyzing in this thesis with 
focus on the location-specific factors. Two examples are access to markets and access 
to resources. The L advantages are presented more in-depth in the next few sections. 
 
2.4 Motives and Localization 
Motives for engaging in transnational operations are closely connected to the choice of 
location. Porter (2000: 265) emphasizes that location is part of the firm‟s overall 
strategy and the choice of location is not always about obtaining low total cost, but 
also the highest value. Motives are tied to the location-specific factors; after all, these 
factors most often constitute the motive. 
2.4.1 Main Motives 
There are several ways of classifying the motives for transnationalizing a company; 
Dicken (2007: 110) provides a good starting point with two categories, namely market 
orientation and asset orientation. More or less all motives can be included in one of the 
two categories. Dunning (2001: 183) has highlighted four FDI motives: natural 
resource-, market-, efficiency- and strategic asset-seeking motives. All of these 
motives, except for market-seeking FDI, may be placed in the asset orientation 
category. Schatz and Venables (2000: 129-132) find two motives for firms to go 
transnational: to better serve a market and to get lower-cost inputs. They supplement 
Dicken‟s categories by stating that market access is often the reason for horizontal 
FDI, while access to cheap inputs is more prominent in vertical FDI.  Dicken‟s (2007: 
110-114) overall framework is: 
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I. Market orientation 
 Most FDI is designed to serve a specific geographical market by locating inside that 
market. These market-oriented investments are a form of horizontal expansion across 
national boundaries, and three aspects of the markets are important: 
a. The size of the market. A common measure is per capita income and 
indicates how the level of demand will vary from place to place.  
b. Structure of demand. Different income levels create different demand 
structures. Increased demand does not affect all products equally, for 
instance, people in countries with high income spends a high proportion of 
their income on „higher-order‟ manufactured goods and services and less on 
basic necessities. 
c. Accessibility. In the past, transport costs played a major role. It is not 
unimportant today, but not significant for all products since different 
technologies have reduced transport costs. Political constraints like trade 
barriers remain essential.  
 
II. Asset orientation 
 A firm needs various assets to produce and sell its products and services, and these 
assets are usually unevenly distributed geographically. The most obvious example 
is the natural resources industry. At the same time, there has been technological 
change in production processes and transportation, a development that has 
diminished the significance of the traditionally important factors of production. 
Access to knowledge and access to labor are now considered the two most 
important location-specific factors. The trend is apparent in high technological 
geographical clusters. The knowledge may be based in certain institutions, but 
much of the attraction of these locations derives from the skills and knowledge 
embodied in labor. Dicken (2007: 111-112) emphasizes five attributes of labor that 
show large geographical variations: 
a. Knowledge and skills. Depends on the breadth and depth of education and 
the area‟s history of development. One indicator is the variation in 
educational levels (extent of literacy, enrolment in various stages of 
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education, public expenditure on education etc.), and education often has a 
high correlation with the distribution of per capita income.  
b. Wage costs. Wage levels differ considerably between countries.  
c. Labor productivity. The productivity varies enormously and reflects 
influences like education, training, skill, motivation and the machinery and 
equipment in use.  
d. Labor „controllability‟. There are geographical differences in the degree of 
labor militancy and the extent of labor unions. Union membership has 
declined markedly in some countries and most firms are wary of highly 
organized labor.  
e. Labor mobility. Labor is less geographically mobile than capital, it is 
strongly place bound. The strength of these ties varies between different 
types of labor. Skilled workers are usually more mobile than unskilled 
workers.  
 
Variations in production costs are significant in the investment-location decision, both 
for asset-oriented and market-oriented investments (Dicken 2007: 113). There is 
always a trade-off between the benefits of market proximity and locational variations 
in production costs, or between input prices and transportation costs. An important 
consideration is the uncertainty of the level of the future production costs at different 
locations. In addition, the investment level of a host country may be of significance to 
investors. According to Solow (1956), economic growth is very strong when countries 
begin to accumulate capital, but the growth will slow down as the process of 
accumulation continues. A high level of capital stock in a country will therefore reduce 
the marginal returns to investment. This will affect the willingness to invest; a firm 
would want to increase its returns to maximize profits. Dunning (1988: 27) emphasizes 
a few other important aspects for FDI: 
- infrastructure provisions in the host country 
- psychic distance 
- economies of centralization (clusters) 
- the economic system and policies of government 
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The motives of market orientation and asset orientation lead to a number of hypotheses 
concerning favorable location-specific factors for FDI. Based on the above discussion 
of the two main motives, these factors will have a positive effect on FDI: access to a 
large market, an educated work force, low wages and access to suppliers. A highly 
unionized work force will have a negative impact on FDI. As Dunning (1988) points 
out, infrastructure provisions in the host country will affect production costs. A well 
developed infrastructure will therefore have a positive effect on FDI. The capital 
density was mentioned last; if one accepts Solow‟s (1956) arguments, a high level of 
investment will have a negative effect on FDI.  
2.4.2 The „New‟ Economic Geography and New Motives 
Location advantages, the main focus of the thesis, forms a part of what is called 
economic geography. Despite globalization, the world is divided in many ways, and 
we still talk about advanced countries, developing countries and the newly advanced 
or newly industrialized countries. Whether you call it agglomerations as Krugman or 
clusters in Porter‟s words, the development towards certain centers of business, „high-
tech‟ or not, affects firms‟ strategies and adds yet another dimension to the choice of 
location. To describe these new motives, it is necessary to understand what new 
economic geography is really about.   
 
The New Economic Geography   
The „new economic geography‟ is developed by Paul Krugman. His model was seen as 
a new departure for this field of study. Many economic activities are concentrated 
geographically, and Krugman (1998: 8) imagines a tug of war between opposing 
forces: centripetal and centrifugal forces. Centripetal forces tend to promote 
concentration, and centrifugal to oppose it. There is no comprehensive list of these 
forces, but market-size effects (linkages) and thick labor markets are examples of 
centripetal forces, and immobile factors and land rents are examples of centrifugal 
forces. All examples of agglomeration reflect both forces; it is merely a question about 
which force has the upper hand. The assumption of economies of scale or increasing 
returns, which enforces the geographic concentration of some activities, is central 
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(Krugman 1998: 10). Production is often seen as taking place in a manufacturing 
„core‟ and in an agricultural „periphery‟, both within a country and between countries.  
 
Even though the market-size effects and immobile factors are emphasized, the market-
size effects may not be as important as a source of agglomeration as presumed, at least 
in urban areas (Krugman 1998: 15). Plants and firms in large cities are usually smaller 
than those in small cities. Big cities may be sustained by increasing returns because of 
thick labor markets or knowledge spillovers, rather than those that emerge from the 
interaction of transport costs and scale economies. So far, empirical work in this area 
has not been very widespread.  
 
High localization of industries was a striking feature of the process of industrialization. 
In his book, Krugman (1991: 36-67) calls attention to three reasons for localization, all 
of them reflecting increasing returns: 
- Labor market pooling: a market for workers with specialized skills arises when 
a number of firms in an industry is located the same place. This benefits both 
workers and firms in terms of risk minimizing.  
- Intermediate inputs: an industrial center allows provision of non-traded inputs 
specific to an industry in greater variety and at lower costs, and it can support 
more specialized local suppliers.                  
- Technological spillovers: information locally flows more easily than over large 
distances, especially between nearby firms. There are also many non-
technological industries with high localization. Spillovers play an important 
role in some industries, but one should not assume that this is always the main 
reason, even in the high technology industries.  
These cumulative processes are pervasive, and labor pooling and the supply of 
specialized inputs play a large role in localization (Krugman 1991: 62). Silicon Valley 
is not unique; it is just the new version of something old. In addition, high technology 
clusters are often the result of visionary bureaucrats. One of these visionaries is Fred 
Terman, vice president of Stanford University and „the creator‟ of Silicon Valley. 
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Singapore may be another example. I will come back to this in the chapter about 
Singapore and in the analysis.  
 
Services are part of the localization story; during the last century the labor force 
employed in services have increased significantly (Krugman 1991: 65-67). Many 
services are non-tradable, for example daycare providers, while other services are 
traded non-stop. Some of the largest localizations in the world today are based on 
financial services, one example is London. Transportation of goods has not become 
significantly cheaper, but, the ability to transmit information has grown at 
unprecedented speed.  
 
Krugman (1991: 98-100) emphasizes two points: there are costs to transactions across 
space and there are economies of scale in production
4
. Economies of scale give the 
producers an incentive to concentrate production in a limited number of locations, and 
the costs of transacting influence the choice of location where there is either a large 
demand or a convenient supply of inputs. Economic geography offers a rethinking of 
economics, from behavior determined by tastes, technology and factor endowments, to 
believing that important aspects of an economy are contingent, determined by history 
and accident, but also by policies.  
 
New Motives   
While Krugman writes about agglomerations and localization, Porter presents his view 
in terms of clusters. Clusters are especially evident in economically advanced areas. 
Porter (2000: 253) claims that clusters are something different than the traditional 
agglomerations. Instead of opposing these two views, I would rather like to stress their 
similarities and view clusters as a kind of extension and complementation of the new 
economic geography. As with agglomerations, labor market pooling and low-cost 
intermediate inputs have an important role in clusters: “A cluster is a geographically 
proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a 
                                              
4
 Economies of scale are the cost advantages that a business obtains due to expansion; the concept refers to 
reductions in unit cost as the size of a facility, or scale, increases. 
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particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities” (Porter 2000: 254). It 
can range from a single city or state to a country or even a group of neighboring 
countries. Most include end product or service companies, suppliers of specialized 
inputs, components, machinery and services, financial institutions and firms in related 
industries. A cluster can also involve a number of institutions, governmental and 
private, that provide support functions as specialized training and education. Most 
cluster participants serve different industry segments, but share common needs and 
opportunities.  
 
Porter (2000: 259) argues that economic agglomerations have shifted in nature, from 
urban areas and narrowly defined industries to clusters where the advantages rest on 
external economies or spillovers across firms and industries. Location therefore needs 
to be integrated in a company‟s global strategy. Many firms decide to outsource 
activities to locations with low wages, low taxes and low utility costs, but, they have 
lost sight of the importance of location in competitive advantage;  it is not just about 
deciding where to build factories or offices. Two elements are important (Porter 2000: 
265-267): 
- Locational choices should weigh overall productivity potential. The aim is low 
total cost or highest value. A shift back toward clusters is beginning among 
companies who once believed in the cost savings of highly dispersed activities. 
- The location determinants vary markedly for different activities. To capture the 
cost advantages of spreading activities, choice of location should be driven by 
factor costs and market access. To harnessing the advantages of clusters, choice 
should be driven by total systems costs and by innovation potential.  
 
Dunning has taken the new motives into consideration in the location decisions of 
firms. During the 1990s FDI intended to augment O advantages, or competitive 
advantages, became an important form of cross-border activity (Dunning 2001: 182). 
This can be seen in the growth of inter-firm strategic alliances. It is not only about 
exploiting O advantages, it is more frequently also about augmenting these 
advantages. TNCs are crossing national borders to create or gain access to resources 
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and capabilities which complement their core advantages. Dunning (2001: 183) calls 
attention to the fact that some recent studies have  
 
…suggested that the locational requirements of strategic asset-seeking FDI are different from 
those of natural resource-, market- or efficiency-seeking FDI, in as much as the former is 
attracted less by the need to reduce production costs, overcome trade barriers, and exploit 
economies of scale, but more by the presence of high-quality physical and human 
infrastructure and a favorable political and commercial ethos towards M&As and cooperative 
alliances.  
 
How do these new motives in the form of agglomerations and clusters affect FDI? 
According to both Porter and Krugman, a high level of FDI in certain sectors, 
combined with other institutions and firms, will have a positive effect on FDI in the 
relevant sectors. Technological spillovers are important for some industries, but the 
presence of skilled labor (labor market pooling) and a wide range of suppliers 
(intermediate inputs) are essential elements in clusters. This also strengthens the 
hypotheses about the positive effect of skilled labor and access to suppliers proposed 
in the previous section concerning asset oriented motives. On the other hand, 
according to Solow (1956), a high level of FDI should rather act as a deterrent on FDI. 
Nevertheless, I keep both hypotheses since clusters focus on a high level of FDI in 
specific sectors, while the other hypothesis focuses on the general level of investments.  
 
2.5 The Investment Development Path: The Role of Government and 
Bureaucracy 
So far, there has been a particular focus on the firm-level and how the firm views the 
location advantages. The L factors are not isolated elements; many of them are 
influenced by policies. A skilled workforce presupposes a high-quality education 
system. Tax policy affects companies‟ cost calculations and hence FDI.  It is time to 
take a wider perspective to see how FDI may fluctuate between countries and across 
time, and to explore the role of government and bureaucracy in attracting FDI. 
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Dunning (2001: 180) has developed a theory named the Investment Development Path 
(IDP) to explain how structural change is connected to FDI patterns:  
 
The basic hypothesis of the IDP is that as a country develops, the configuration of the OLI 
advantages facing foreign-owned firms that might invest in that country, and that of its own 
firms that might invest overseas, undergoes change, and that it is possible to identify both the 
conditions making for the change and their effect on the trajectory of the country‟s 
development. 
 
According to the IDP theory, a country may pass through several development stages, 
the first one being pre-industrialization where it has no inbound or outbound 
investment because of insufficient locational attractions and its firms have few or no O 
advantages (Dunning 2001: 181). The locational attractions will increase by creating a 
satisfactory legal system, commercial infrastructure and business culture, human 
resources, and it also depends on the government‟s policy towards FDI. By improving 
the L advantages, one may help indigenous firms to improve their O advantages. The 
situation can change into one where outward investments become larger than inward 
investments, but this is a dynamic process depending on the specific OLI 
configuration. The final stage is reached when there is a fluctuating balance between 
inward and outward direct investment (Dunning and Narula 1996). 
 
The IDP is based on two premises: there are consistent patterns of structural change in 
development and these changes have systematic relations with patterns of FDI (Lall 
1996: 423). The effects of FDI depend largely on how each country, or its government, 
is able to improve its market, develop skills and technological resources and extract 
spillovers from the presence of TNCs (Lall 1996: 425). Taking into consideration 
initial endowments like size, location and natural resources, the most important 
influence seems to be that of government policies. Policies can influence the 
underlying determinants of OLI factors, which in turn determine how and how much 
each country participates in international production. Dunning and Narula (1996: 25) 
trace systematic differences between countries to three variables: 
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1. The extent and nature of the country‟s created and natural assets 
2. The strategy of economic development 
3. The role of government 
 
While institutions are the rules, organizations are defined as the players according to 
North (1990: 5). Organizations are shaped by institutions, but also shape institutions. 
They include political bodies, economic bodies, social bodies and educational bodies – 
groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives. The 
government is one organization which role has been emphasized as decisive for 
country‟s development, along with choice of strategy. Choice of strategy can often be 
understood as policy towards FDI and also industrial policy in general. Lall (1996: 
440) indicates that there are three broad approaches to FDI: the passive open door 
policy, pro-active policies to attract and guide FDI to beneficial activities for local 
development and selective policies to enhance national capabilities. The best example 
of the pro-active policy is Singapore. Singapore has the highest level of dependence on 
TNCs in the world and has used many measures to ensure that the country‟s 
development objectives are met. Even though industrial policy is a controversial issue, 
Rodrik (2004) has argued that one should not reject industrial policy totally, nor 
consider it a universal remedy. Industrial policy should be viewed as “…strategic 
collaboration between the private sector and the government with the aim of 
uncovering where the most significant obstacles to restructuring lie and what type of 
interventions are most likely to remove them” (Rodrik 2004: 4). Singapore has 
combined pro-active FDI policy with industrial policy; “Note that these policies were 
often highly selective and targeted, building up infant industries and promoting 
indigenous enterprises, and not just „market supportive‟ in the sense of being non-
selective strengthening of market institutions” (Lall 1996: 426). Part of the industrial 
policy might even be directed towards creating agglomerations and clusters to attract 
more FDI to specific sectors, and to achieve the economic benefits associated with 
these types of structures.  
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At the macroeconomic level, social relational capital is an important factor influencing 
the location of economic activity by TNCs. The social relational capital is measured 
by the lack of crime, bribery, corruption and terrorism (Dunning 2001: 186). 
Corruption can be defined as “the sale by government officials of government property 
for personal gain” (Schleifer and Vishny 1993: 599). Corruption and political 
instability negatively affect expected profits and is therefore harmful to business. 
Decentralized corruption is even worse than centralized corruption – it can lead to a 
situation where a foreigner must bribe every agency involved in the investment 
process and increases the risk significantly. Corruption is also highly distortionary 
because of the necessary secrecy; this secrecy can shift a country‟s investments away 
from the highest value project into potentially useless projects where there are better 
opportunities for corruption (Schleifer and Vishny 1993: 616). It is essential to avoid 
corruption among bureaucrats, and politicians, to attract FDI.    
 
The role of the government has been stressed, but the bureaucracy is another important 
organization. The bureaucracy is the agent who is going to see to that the strategy of 
the principal, in this case the government, is carried through. Industrial policy is one 
example where bureaucratic competence is absolutely necessary (Rodrik 2004). It is 
also an agency of considerable significance for foreign investors. Establishing local 
production usually involves a variety of additional costs where some are the costs of 
dealing with foreign administrations, regulations and tax systems (Schatz and 
Venables 2000: 129). The bureaucracy is the regulator, the enforcer of rules. Firms 
cannot operate efficiently under massive amounts of red tape or under a court system 
that fails to resolve disputes quickly and fairly (Porter 2000: 257). With an efficient 
bureaucracy, a host country is better prepared for dealing with investors, and this is a 
location advantage in itself.  
 
Max Weber argues for the bureaucracy‟s value as one of the institutional foundations 
of capitalist growth, and a clear separation of public and private property is one of the 
characteristics of the bureaucracy (Whimster 2004: 245-249). Other characteristics of 
Weber‟s ideal model of bureaucracy include: fixed jurisdiction, a clear hierarchical 
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organization, written and organized files, specialized training, meritocratic 
recruitment, full-time career jobs and the existence of general rules. These measures 
are to ensure competent and motivated people working as bureaucrats and to avoid 
corruption. The ideal bureaucracy optimizes efficiency and pursues impartiality in 
place of favoritism. Evans (1995) builds on Weber‟s analysis and looks at how the 
structure of bureaucracy and state-society relations influence the effect of industrial 
policy. Evans (1995: 40) argues that it is the lack of bureaucracy that undermines 
development. It is crucial that the bureaucracy has autonomy; that is the ability to 
shape and implement its own goals.  However, to be able to do this, the bureaucracy 
also needs to keep in touch with the rest of the society through a process of 
information feedback. On the basis of this, Evans (1995: 50) defines the expression 
„embedded autonomy‟ as combining “…Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense 
connection to the surrounding social structure, offering a concrete resolution to the 
theoretical debate over state-society relations…”. It is about keeping a fine balance 
between independence and social ties to achieve development and economic growth. 
Singapore and the other East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) are used as 
examples of the correct „developmental state‟. If there is no autonomy, the result may 
be corruption that is harmful to FDI, and without embeddedness, there might not be an 
interest in promoting development (Evans 1995: 59).   
 
It is a multifaceted picture, from where I will propose a few hypotheses. Policies 
influence FDI both through general policy like tax, but also through industrial or 
sector-specific industry (Dunning and Narula 1996, Rodrik 2004, Lall 1996). Low 
corporate tax and other cost-reducing government interventions will have a positive 
influence on FDI, and sector-specific industry policy will also have a positive effect on 
FDI. According to the discussion above, a system characterized by enforcement of 
property rights, rule of law and of control of corruption and crime will have a positive 
effect on FDI (Dunning 2001, Porter 2000, Schleifer and Vishny 1993). Last, but not 
least, an efficient bureaucracy will have a positive effect on FDI (Rodrik 2004, Evans 
1995).  
 
25 
 
2.6 Operationalizing Theory and Summary of Hypotheses  
I argue that all the theoretical frameworks presented above are relevant for the 
research question raised in this thesis. They all contribute to the understanding of why 
investors seek out specific locations, and what governments conversely must do to 
attract FDI. How is it possible to combine all this knowledge and theories? How do the 
different factors affect each other? The focus of the thesis is location-specific variables 
in the shape of political and economic factors. These factors are highly interconnected 
and the direction of causality may go either way. I have decided to concentrate on a 
few relationships: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Causal Model 
 
According to North, institutions are „the rules of the game‟ (1990). Political and 
economic institutions therefore comprise laws and regulations, both concerning 
politics and the economy. These institutions affect the economic factors and policy, 
which again affect FDI. Policy also influences FDI directly and indirectly. Education 
policy affects FDI indirectly through the workers‟ level of skills, defined as part of the 
economic factors, while tax policy affects FDI directly.  
 
To operationalize this model, the two categories business environment and policy 
environment provide a good starting point. Business environment has been divided 
into economic factors and economic institutions. Economic factors comprise the 
traditional motives of market and asset orientation. Economic institutions include rules 
and laws, but also level of corruption and the bureaucracy. Even though the 
bureaucracy is considered an organization, I have placed it as part of the economic 
institutions. Organizations like the government and the bureaucracy affect institutions, 
Political and 
economic institutions 
institutions 
FDI 
Policy 
FDI Economic factors 
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and the bureaucracy is the enforcer of many rules and regulations. The economic 
institutions therefore decide the rules of the game in the marketplace. Policy 
environment is made up of general policy and sector-specific policy. General policy 
encompasses regulations such as tax and customs, while sector-specific policy 
includes industrial policy and R&D policy. In Table 2.1, it is possible to see the 
operationalizing of the factors.  
 
Table 2.1: Operationalizing Political and Economic Factors 
Business Environment  
 
Policy Environment  
Economic Factors 
 
Market size: national and regional 
Labor: wages, unions and education 
level 
Input prices: access to suppliers 
Level of investment/capital scarcity 
Infrastructure and access to land 
Natural resources 
 
 
Economic Institutions 
 
Rule of law 
Property rights 
Control of corruption 
and crime 
Bureaucracy 
 
General Policy 
 
Tax and 
government 
incentives 
Customs 
Investment 
treaty 
Sector-specific 
Policy 
Industrial policy 
R&D (cluster 
effects) 
 
Singapore has very few natural resources; some would say none while others would 
point to the advantage of location. There is no investment treaty between Singapore 
and Norway. These two relationships are therefore not considered. The theories 
presented earlier in the chapter are the basis for the hypotheses, and the hypotheses are 
structured according to the operationalization of the political and economic factors. 
The hypotheses will be used to evaluate the case of Norwegian FDI in Singapore. In 
the thesis I will investigate the 12 hypotheses already presented: seven for economic 
factors, two for economic institutions, one for general policy and two for sector-
specific policy in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2: Hypotheses 
Category Number Hypotheses 
Economic 
Factors 
I A large market size will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Economic 
Factors 
II A highly educated work force will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Economic 
Factors 
III Low wages will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Economic 
Factors 
IV A highly unionized work force will have a negative impact on FDI. 
Economic 
Factors 
V Access to suppliers will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Economic 
Factors 
VI A high level of investment will have a negative effect on FDI.  
Economic 
Factors 
VII A well developed infrastructure will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Economic 
Institutions 
VIII 
A system characterized by enforcement of property rights, rule of law 
and of control of corruption and crime will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Economic 
Institutions 
IX An efficient bureaucracy will have a positive effect on FDI. 
General Policy 
 
X 
Low corporate tax and other cost-reducing government interventions 
will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Sector-specific 
Policy 
XI 
Sector-specific industrial policy will have a positive effect on FDI (in 
the targeted sectors).  
Sector-specific 
Policy 
XII 
A high level of R&D in certain sectors, along with other institutions and 
firms (clusters), will have a positive effect on FDI in the relevant sectors. 
 
The firms must always balance the maximization of expected profits against the risk of 
investing. The risk of investing depends on the factors in Table 2.2. Although there are 
many factors that influence the choice of location, different firms have different 
motives and will rank the factors according to the individual firm‟s perception of risk 
and profit. 
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3. NORWEGIAN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
As mentioned in the introduction, Norway has become a home country for sizeable 
amounts of FDI. In this chapter I will briefly sketch recent developments in FDI 
according to UNCTAD‟s World Investment Report 2008. Increases in Norwegian 
outward FDI is not an isolated incidence, it is part of increasing FDI flows on a global 
scale.  After an overview of the global FDI pattern, focus turns to Norwegian FDI and 
earlier findings and research on this subject. First, the overall size and the trend of the 
investments are presented, including the geographically distribution of Norwegian FDI 
in regions and host countries. Second, the pattern is broken down into sectors, 
industries and companies to identify the characteristics of Norwegian TNCs. This 
information will be used in the analysis to see if the data in this thesis is in agreement 
with previous research, and what this may tell us about Norwegian FDI.  
 
3.1 FDI: World Pattern 
FDI reached a new record high in 2007 with inflows of $1,833 billion, corresponding 
to 30% growth, surpassing the all-time high set in 2000 by some $400 billion (see 
Figure 3.1). All three major economic groupings, as classified by UNCTAD; 
developed countries, developing countries and the transition economies of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), experienced growth (WIR 2008: 3). The 
rise in FDI reflected a general high economic growth from 2006 to 2007 and strong 
economic performance, especially increased corporate profits of both parent firms and 
foreign affiliates. The growth was driven by cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) and greenfield projects. M&A activity expanded while the number of 
greenfield projects decreased from 12,441 in 2006 to 11,703 in 2007 (WIR: 2008: 4). 
In the first quarter of 2008, the crisis and therefore the subsequent more cautious 
lending behavior of banks hampered M&A financing. The number of greenfield 
projects stayed at the same level as the first quarter of 2007 (WIR 2008: 5). The 
economic crisis has led to liquidity problems, and this will affect FDI flows at the 
macroeconomic level (WIR 2008: 18).  
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Figure 3.1: FDI Inflows: Global and by Group of Economies 1980-2007 
In billions of dollars, taken from World Investment Report 2008 (WIR 2008:1). 
 
Even though all regions saw record inflows and outflows in 2007, the high growth 
rates reduced the share of developing countries of FDI inflows from 29% to 27% and 
their share of FDI outflows from 16% to 13% (WIR 2008: 7-8). FDI inflows to South, 
East and Southeast Asia and Oceania increased 18% to $249 billion, half of all FDI 
going to developing economies.  This region has also become a significant source of 
FDI outflows with outward FDI of $150 billion in 2007. FDI inflows to developed 
countries reached $1,248 billion, 33% more than in 2006, and FDI outflows grew with 
56% to $1,692 billion. The United States retained its position as the largest FDI 
recipient country and the largest source of FDI. The European Union continued to be 
the largest host region within the group of developed countries (WIR 2008: 7).  
 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have recently emerged as direct investors. These 
funds have about $5 trillion under management, but FDI amounts are relatively small. 
In 2007, FDI by SWFs was only $10 billion; 0.2% of their total assets and 0.6% of 
total FDI flows (WIR 2008: 20-21). Their acquisitions are normally portfolio 
investments, less than 10% ownership – the threshold for FDI investments. Almost 
75% of the funds‟ FDI has been invested in developed countries, usually into the 
services sector.  The Government Pension Fund of Norway, one of 70 government 
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funds, is considered the “gold standard” of governance of SWFs because of its concern 
and achievement within accountability, transparency and professionalism (WIR 2008: 
26).  
 
If one looks at the world sectoral pattern, there has been an increase in FDI flows to 
the primary sector, mainly the extractive industries, but the services sector still 
accounts for the largest share of global FDI stocks and flows. The share of 
manufacturing has continued to decline. The services sector‟s share is 62% of 
estimated world inward FDI in 2006. Trade, financial services and business activities 
continue to account for a large proportion of FDI in the services sector, but 
infrastructure have begun to attract increasing shares of FDI (WIR 2008: 9).  
 
3.2 FDI: The Norwegian Pattern 
Grünfeld emphasizes that Norwegian ownership abroad takes place primarily through 
portfolio investments, different kinds of loans and FDI (2005: 8). The Government 
Pension Fund of Norway (also known as the Petrolum Fund of Norway) is worth over 
NOK 2,000 billion (NBIM 2009). When one looks at Norwegian investments from 
1995 to 2003, about 2/3 of Norwegian capital invested abroad was portfolio 
investment and 1/3 FDI (Grünfeld 2005: 10).  
3.2.1 Overall and Regional Pattern  
Norwegian outward FDI, on a large scale, is a relatively new phenomenon. In the 
1980s Norwegian outward FDI started to grow mainly due to the offshore oil industry 
producing a capital surplus (Hveem et al. 2008a: 1-2). In 1995, outward FDI stock 
overtook inward FDI stock, and during the period 1998 to 2005 outward FDI stock 
grew by 179% and reached USD 98 billion (NOK 665 billion, 36% of GDP). In the 
period 1998-2005, outward Norwegian FDI increased by 16% on average annually 
(Hveem et al. 2008a: 4). The growth was weak in the period 2001-2004, but the strong 
increase continued in 2005 (SSB 2009a). On the other side, the interest in Norway 
from foreign investors has begun to fade (Heum 2004: 58). The total number of 
Norwegian affiliates abroad is about 5,200. Even though a large part of Norwegian 
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FDI has gone to M&As, the numbers indicate that Norwegian FDI are relatively more 
oriented towards greenfield investment than the OECD average (Grünfeld 2005: 11). 
The oil sector makes up about one third of total FDI from Norway. 
 
The growth of Norwegian companies abroad is a development that has also taken 
place in Sweden, Denmark and Finland (Heum 2004: 57). This is demonstrated in 
Table 3.1. Despite the increase, Norwegian companies lag behind its neighboring 
countries when comparing FDI stocks; the other Nordic countries have invested 
abroad in an even larger degree than Norway. 
 
Table 3.1: FDI Stock abroad – a comparison of Norway, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden 1990-2007 
 1990 2000 2006 2007 
Norway 9.4 27.7 36.2 34.1 
Denmark 5.4 45.7 54.1 53.3 
Finland 8.0 42.8 45.1 46.2 
Sweden 20.9 50.2 66.7 67.8 
Numbers as a percentage of gross domestic product (UNCTAD 2009b).   
  
The regional distribution of Norwegian FDI stock has been highly concentrated, but 
the trend has been towards less concentration; in 1997, 92% of the stock was located in 
OECD countries, while at the end of 2005 the share was reduced to 75%. The share of 
Western Europe dropped from about 70% in 1999 to just above 50% in 2005 (see 
Table 3.2). This decline was driven by a substantial investment surge in other regions, 
for example Asia (Hveem et al. 2008a: 6).  
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Table 3.2: Regional Shares of Outward Norwegian FDI Stocks 1969-2005 
 
Table taken from Hveem et al. (2008a). 
 
Norwegian FDI is also concentrated in certain host countries; in 2005 the five largest 
host countries made up about 49% of total FDI and the 10 largest 73% (Hveem et al. 
2008a: 6). Norway‟s neighboring countries have continued to be among the most 
important destinations of outward FDI. The trend though, has been toward less 
concentration also at the national level. New host countries include Singapore which 
experienced an annual average growth of 47% of Norwegian FDI between 1998 and 
2005 (Hveem et al. 2008a: 7). Other countries that experienced a large influx of 
Norwegian investments were Canada, Angola and Azerbaijan, but these can be 
explained as petroleum-related investments. In addition to geographical proximity, 
Selfors (1999: 47) 
 
calls attention to the role of economic proximity or similarity, in 
line with the convergence hypothesis; FDI tends to be more important relative to trade 
between relatively similar countries with respect to size, relative endowments and 
technologies. 
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3.2.2 Sectors, Industries and Companies 
Norwegian internationalization has been characterized by natural resource extraction 
and exports and of international shipping (Hveem et al. 2008a: 10). This makes 
Norway different from other typical Western European countries where banking, 
insurance and financial services make up a large share of outward FDI. Norwegian 
companies in these sectors have made small investments abroad, but outward 
Norwegian FDI has grown by an average of 29% annually in the finance branch during 
the last couple of years. In 2001, FDI in the industry sector constituted 40% of 
Norwegian FDI, oil 20% and services 40%  (Grünfeld 2005: 12). The 40% share of 
total Norwegian FDI abroad in the services sector is noticeably less than the global 
average of 62%. Industries like pulp and paper, ship building, oil and gas, chemical 
products, shipping and telecommunications represent the greater part of the 
investments. This suggests that Norwegian companies are following a niche strategy, 
and that they are very active in certain market segments (Hveem et al. 2000: 27). 
These investments are also characterized by a few large investors, mostly small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) since the largest Norwegian companies are not 
controlled by foreign owners, but the state. The outward FDI of state-owned 
companies has grown at 18.4% annually (Hveem et al. 2008a: 10). 
 
In Western Europe there are three dominant industry groups among the Norwegian 
subsidiaries: wholesale and retail trade, manufacture of consumer goods and 
manufacture of engineering products (Selfors 1999: 45). In North America and Asia, 
engineering industries and commercial activities account for the major part of 
Norwegian FDI. Benito et al. (2002) describe the top 10 privately owned Norwegian 
companies as an “eclectic collection”; most of the companies are rather “old-
fashioned” conglomerates that operate in a variety of industries and product categories. 
Selfors (1999) also finds it difficult to distinguish a Norwegian pattern among the 70 
companies included in her survey; the variety of sectors is quite large.  
 
If one goes from looking at sectors to looking at the firm level; what characterizes 
Norwegian TNCs? First and foremost, Norwegian corporations remain large in 
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Norway, but they are quite small in a global perspective (Hveem et al. 2000, Selfors 
1999). The ten largest Norwegian companies (excluding state-owned), compared to 
other small countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, are predominantly small 
(Benito et al. 2002: 72). Second, FDI is heavily concentrated among a few large 
Norwegian companies. The five largest corporations account for about 70% of 
Norwegian FDI, the 20 largest make up more than 85% (Grünfeld 2005: 13). Very few 
of these have foreign majority ownership and none of the top five. The five largest 
companies‟ are either majority owned by the state or have a dominant Norwegian 
owner. Third, the companies are also characterized by belonging to capital intensive 
industries, which again explains their high volumes of FDI. Fourth, Norwegian 
companies have also become transnationalized (Heum 2005: 56). The development of 
the 30 largest industry corporations in Norway in the period 1980 to 2000 was studied, 
measuring share of sales and employment abroad as indicators of transnationalizing. 
Both indicators show considerable increases: share of the companies‟ sales abroad rose 
from 53% in 1980 to 78% in 2000, while share of employees abroad rose from 9% in 
1980 to 59% in 2000. The change is especially evident in the share of employees 
abroad. In 1980, most companies had more than 90% of their employees in Norway, 
but in 2000 over half of the companies‟ employees were workers abroad.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that a large share of Norwegian TNCs‟ operations are 
undertaken abroad, and a major part of foreign sales takes place in their subsidiaries 
(Selfors 1999: 73). R&D and headquarters are primarily localized in Norway, but there 
is a development toward internationalizing strategic activities (Benito et al. 2002: 75). 
For example, the number of division or business area headquarters located abroad 
increased from 1 to 27 for Norwegian companies in the period 1990-1999.  The main 
motive for FDI seems to be market access (Selfors 1999, Benito et al.2002, Heum 
2004). Other important motives are lower costs and access to resources. In Selfors‟ 
(1999: 70) study, 88% of the companies stated that market access was an important 
motivation factor behind the establishment of the subsidiaries. In comparison, access 
to skilled labor was important in 32% of the establishments. The significance of 
market access is also clearly stated in the case of Singapore; the city-state is described 
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as the gateway to Southeast and East Asia for Norwegian companies, an entrance to a 
giant market which is rapidly developing (Gisnås 1995).  
 
3.3 Summary  
Norwegian outward FDI increased 16% on average annually in the period 1998-2005. 
The period 2001-2004 was characterized by a weaker growth in Norwegian FDI, 
reflecting the global FDI pattern where FDI again began to increase in 2004 (see 
Figure 3.1). Global M&A activity has expanded, but Norwegian FDI is relatively more 
oriented towards greenfield investment than M&As. Another difference is the sector 
composition; the service sector accounts for the largest share of global FDI stocks and 
flows, about 60%, while Norwegian FDI consists of 40% manufacturing, 20% oil and 
40% services. Norwegian investments abroad have been characterized by natural 
resource extraction and exports, and of international shipping, not services as in many 
other European countries. In addition, Norwegian FDI is very concentrated in a few 
regions and a few countries, but the trend is towards more diversification 
geographically. Norwegian companies are large in Norway, but rather small on a 
global scale, and FDI is heavily concentrated among a few large companies. The 
predominant motive for Norwegian companies to invest abroad seems to be access to 
markets.  
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4. SINGAPORE: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
How did Singapore manage to achieve a growth rate of 8.5% per annum from 1966 to 
1990 – was it truly an Asian miracle or only a myth as Krugman (1994) argues? In less 
than 30 years the employed share of the population went from 27% to 51%, the 
educational standards were heavily upgraded and Singapore made an enormous 
investment in physical capital. Krugman (1994:80) compares the Asian growth with 
the growth of Warsaw Pact nations in the 1950s and describes Singapore‟s 
development as based on “…a mobilization of resources that would have done Stalin 
proud”. The growth is according to Young (1995) mainly due to the increase in inputs, 
such as labor, physical capital and human capital, and not due to increased economic 
efficiency. This does not mean that increases in economic inputs of the scale witnessed 
in Singapore are easy to achieve; it is based on one-time changes and an impressive 
mobilization of resources.  
 
This chapter gives an overview of Singapore‟s history with focus on the economic 
development and an assessment of the situation today. First, I will present Singapore‟s 
economic development starting in the 1870s. This is to show that development in 
Singapore is not an entirely new phenomenon, but has roots further back in time than 
the 1960s (Huff 1994). Second, I will briefly review the country‟s current situation and 
take a look at challenges ahead, both internal and external. The purpose is to 
understand how Singapore has been and still is able to attract FDI, and what kind of 
location advantages the country has to offer Norwegian companies.  
 
4.1 A History of Location 
In 1819 Singapore was incorporated under the British Empire. Sir Stamford Raffles, 
known as the “Father of Singapore”, described the position of the British station as 
combining the best geographical and local advantages (Huff 1994: 8). Singapore 
developed first as an entrepot port for the Malayan region, a trading post where 
merchandise can be imported and exported without paying import duties. The port was 
considered „the gate of the East‟, and the combined role of entrepot and a port of call 
led to an explosive growth; the average trade growth between 1870 and 1937 was 
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3.3% (Huff 1994: 11-12). Singapore‟s growth until the 1960s depended largely on 
three staple exports from the Malayan region; tin from Malaya, rubber from Malaya 
and Indonesia (Netherlands India) and petroleum exports from Indonesia
5
. Huff (1994: 
14-22) argues therefore that the development of Singapore is best analyzed as that of a 
staple port, at least until the beginning of the 1970s. Singapore was one of only a few 
ports that grew due to economic specialization, and was transformed into a 
commercial center. Business interests in Singapore became intertwined with the 
interests of the hinterland producers, in contrast to entrepot ports like London with 
only weak links to producers. 
 
Singapore was rather detached from its hinterland, both politically and ethnically – it 
grew as a Chinese city under British rule (Huff 1994: 26). The Japanese occupation of 
Singapore during World War II was an embarrassing defeat for the British and was 
followed by independence in 1959 (Store Norske Leksikon 2009). The People‟s 
Action Party (PAP) won Singapore‟s first election as a self-governing state (Huff 
1994: 28-30). The PAP is still in power today, and Singapore can therefore be 
described as a one-party state
6
. In 1963 the Federation of Malaysia was formed 
comprising the Malayan Peninsula, Singapore and Sarawak and Sabah (former British 
Borneo except for Brunei). By including British Borneo, the federation prevented a 
Chinese dominance. The new state was a compromise involving recognition of 
Singapore‟s economic position and its Chinese population (76%), but political 
differences and mistrust escalated. In August 1965, the federation between Malaysia 
and Singapore came to an end.   
 
Economically, Singapore faced two problems in the 1960s: lack of capital formation 
and unemployment (Huff 1994: 33). The World Bank recommended a program of 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) led by private capital investment, and an 
extensive role for the state in attracting and supporting that investment (Rodan 2001: 
143-145). The subsequent development plan followed the recommendations and led to 
                                              
5
 Staple denotes a raw material or resource-intensive good central to the exports of a region (Huff 1994: 14).  
6
 Lee Kuan Yew was prime minister from 1959 until 1990, followed by Goh Chok Tong to 2004. In 2004 Lee 
Hsien Loong, the son of Lee Kuan Yew, took over (Store Norske Leksikon 2009). 
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the introduction of the Economic Development Board (EDB). However, the 
unemployment continued to rise and the situation resulted in a re-evaluation of the ISI 
strategy. The solution seemed to be export-oriented industrialization (EOI), a strategy 
already embarked upon by Hong Kong and Taiwan (Rodan 2001: 145). An EOI 
strategy would require close attention to labor costs. The government set about to blunt 
independent labor by marshalling the PAP-affiliated National Trades Union Congress 
(NTUC). The institutionalizing of government intervention in the labor market 
continued in 1972 with the adoption of the National Wages Council (NWC). The EDB 
assumed a greatly enhanced role in coordinating the government‟s investment drive 
and a range of specialized institutions were established: the Jurong Town Corporation 
(JTC) in 1968 to take responsibility for the industrial estates, the Development Bank of 
Singapore (DBS) to provide finance, and the Central Provident Fund (CPF) and the 
Post Office Savings Bank to support domestic savings. A great part of the compulsory 
domestic savings was invested in physical and social infrastructure. All of these 
institutions would continue to assist in Singapore‟s development. The government had 
set about a conscious effort to affect the costs of the different factors of production; 
“…the government was helping to shape Singapore‟s comparative advantage in the 
production of labour-intensive manufactures” (Rodan 2001: 146).  
 
The EOI strategy was a success, manufacturing became the economy‟s leading sector, 
and Singapore could no longer be described as a staple port (Huff 1994: 34).  The 
contribution of manufacturing to GDP increased from 15% in 1965 to about 23% in 
1974, the unemployment rate fell to 4% and the economy experienced double-digit 
growth during the same period (Rodan 2001: 146). The industrialization of Singapore 
was the key to economic growth, and it was helped by drawing FDI to the country. 
Government owned enterprises engaged in alliances with TNCs, and the alliance 
formed the crucible of Singapore Incorporated (Haley et al. 1996: 18). The process 
was fostered by transnational companies mainly from the United States, United 
Kingdom and Japan. Higher costs in these countries made companies look for cheaper 
production sites overseas, something Singapore could offer (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 6). 
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By 1978 labor shortages posed a serious problem and the government shied away from 
increasing the number of guest workers (Rodan 2001: 146-148). The choice fell on a 
two-pronged strategy: to increase technological sophistication and raise the 
contribution of manufacturing to the economic growth. Measures to discourage 
unskilled, labor-intensive production were implemented through the „corrective wages 
policy‟ of NWC that led to large wage cost increases. At the same time, the companies 
were encouraged to technological upgrading through incentives and training schemes. 
The process led to a further dismantling of the unions‟ power, the two largest trade 
unions were divided into nine industry-based unions. The high wage policy brought 
with it some significant gains (Rodan 2001: 148-150). Singapore became a global 
center for the computer disk-drive industry, but there were also structural limits to the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector. When the economy contracted with 2% in 
1985, the first negative growth since the independence, a move towards the services 
sector was recommended.  
 
Singapore‟s new vision for the 1980s was to become „a total business center‟ and new 
incentives were introduced. According to Huff (1994: 38), international services 
became the third growth component along with staples and manufacturing during the 
1980s. Financial and business services were the most important aspect of services 
sector diversification. Comparative advantage in the provision of international services 
derived from location advantages in linking regional and global markets, just like for 
the staple port (Huff 1994: 40). To maintain competitiveness into the 1990s, Singapore 
aimed to promote alliances with knowledge intensive firms and institutions. The goals 
for 2000 were to strengthen Singapore‟s industry clusters, to make the country a node 
between Asia and the rest of the world, to make local enterprises into successful TNCs 
and promote regionalization (Haley et al. 1996: 19). To expand Singapore‟s regional 
and global horizons, new government-linked companies (GLCs) were created and 
offshore initiatives became an important part of the operations of state companies 
(Rodan 2001: 152-154). The establishment of economic zones in Malaysia and 
Indonesia was part of the regionalization strategy; the government was creating „mini-
Singapores‟ abroad.  
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Singapore was affected negatively by the Asian crisis of 1997/98, growth dropped 
from 8.4% in 1997 to 0.4% the following year (Rodan 2001: 154-156). One cost-
cutting measure was the reduction of wages, especially for the lowest-paid workers. 
The crisis was also seen as an opportunity to enhance regional economic supremacy 
and extend restructuring. The new vision was to transform Singapore from a regional 
financial center into an international financial center, which again promoted 
complementary state initiatives and market reforms to achieve this. The crisis led to 
the conception of a new economy, a „K-economy‟ (Knowledge-based economy). 
However, it was the manufacturing sector that kept Singapore afloat during the 
recession, particularly the semiconductor industry (Rodan 2001: 156). 
 
4.2 Singapore Today and Challenges Ahead 
Singapore has been a regular “growth engine” since the 1960s, but what are the main 
challenges for Singapore in the beginning of the 21
st
 century? As a starting point, a 
summary of the current situation in Singapore‟s business and policy environment is 
presented in Table 4.1.  
4.2.1 Internal  
The overriding objective of Singapore is still growth. To grow the economy, there are 
three options: enlarge the pool of manpower, accumulate capital and improving 
knowledge, skills and technology (Kai-Sun 2001: 40). Singapore has made extensive 
use of the two first sources of growth; the work force participation is high (80% of 
males and 52% of women), the wages are relatively high compared to other countries 
in the region, the growth of the population is low, the return rate of investment is low 
and the savings rate high (50%). The cost advantages of Singapore are rapidly eroding 
due to rising land prices, wages and business costs (Siow Yue 2005: 32). The 
government is now betting on the third source of growth, namely improving 
knowledge through the K-economy and the promotion of R&D (Kai-Sun 2001, Rodan 
2001). 
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Table 4.1: Business and Policy Environment in Singapore 
Business   environment 
Economic factors 
Market size:  
National and 
regional 
The national market is limited with a population of 4.5 million people, but 
Singapore has an advantageous location in Asia and Southeast Asia – in a fast 
growing region made up of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam.  
Labor:  
Wages, labor 
standards, unions 
and education levels 
Wages are controlled through the NWC and NTUC (Pinkney 2005: 134). 
Wages for skilled workers are relatively high, but lower than in Western 
Europe (Dicken 2007: 113). Education levels are rising; in 2004 16% of the 
population had university qualifications (Siow Yue 2005: 39). 
Input prices: 
Access to suppliers 
Access to suppliers is very dependent on type of industry and sectors. The 
largest manufacturing clusters are electronics and chemicals (Siow Yue 2005).  
Level of investment/ 
Capital scarcity 
Singapore has been investing heavily for decades and with an internal savings 
rate at 50% and large inward FDI there is no capital scarcity (Kai-Sun et al. 
2001: 40). The rate of return for the individual investments in Singapore 
depends on the industry and the project.  
Infrastructure and 
access to land 
Singapore was ranked as number three in the world in achieving good road 
standards (Hultgren and Bentzrød 2009). It also has one of the busiest 
container ports in the world and a large and efficient airport (Changi). Land is 
scarce in Singapore, but through government agencies as the EDB and the JTC 
it is possible to find suitable locations. There is also some privately owned 
property. 
Economic institutions 
Rule of law The legal system is based on English common law, and Singapore is known for 
its strict laws and regulations (CIA Factbook 2009).  
Control of 
corruption and 
crime 
Singapore is ranked at 4
th
 place in the corruption perception index 
(Transparency International 2009). The government has minimized corruption 
through control of opportunities and incentives for corruption. 
Property rights The state is the largest land owner in Singapore; land is leased to companies 
and inhabitants.  
Bureaucracy Singapore‟s bureaucracy is based on meritocracy and very efficient. The EDB 
has been described as a “one-stop” service to foreign investors (Kai-Sun et al. 
2001). 
Policy 
General policy 
Tax and government 
incentives 
The corporate tax in Singapore is 17% (EDB 2009). There is also a wide range 
of incentives to encourage foreign investment and research and development 
activities; a company may be granted tax-free status for a certain period and 
also lower tax (pioneer and post-pioneer status), double deduction, R&D 
reserve and Operational Headquarters Scheme (Kai-Sun et al. 2001).  
Customs 
 
All goods imported into or manufactured in Singapore are subject to duties 
and/or Goods and Service Tax, but also here there are various exceptions 
through customs schemes (Singapore Customs 2009). GST is 7%.  
Sector-specific policy 
Industrial policy The government intends to maintain a sizeable share of industry in the 
economy (about 30%) in addition to services (Kai-Sun et al. 2001). The leading 
industries are electronics, chemicals, precision and transport engineering and 
biomedical manufacturing. In 2004 services made up 63% of the economy 
(financial services 11.3%), and manufacturing 27.7% (Siow Yue 2005).  
R&D Singapore wants to strengthen R&D and have identified electronics, chemicals, 
engineering and alternative energy among many others as industries to be 
nurtured (EDB 2009).  
42 
 
The major political issue is the unequal distribution of material rewards and the sense 
of marginalization among the working class and the lower middle class (Rodan 2001: 
161-164). Singapore‟s ministerial salaries are among the highest in the world and have 
been repeatedly criticized by the public. This may cause some social unrest in the 
future. Another related challenge is the future structural unemployment that will affect 
older less-educated workers in an economy requiring a high level of skills. The 
NTUC‟s capacity to mobilize workers behind the government‟s reform agenda will 
also be put to the test now that opposition calls for more autonomy to trade unions and 
to minimize inequalities (Rodan 2001: 164). 
4.2.2 External 
“Without any doubt, the most significant global shift in the geography of the world 
economy during the past 40 years has been the resurgence of Asia – especially East 
Asia” (Dicken 2007: 43). After the East Asian financial crisis, it seems like the future 
is China, and possibly India. China‟s growth has made Northeast Asia the most 
dynamic part of Asia, and this may cause problems for smaller countries in Southeast 
Asia like Singapore (Dicken 2007: 45). Here, I will concentrate on Malaysia, one of 
the „tiger cubs‟, as a possible competitor to Singapore. Malaysia is especially 
important with regard to Jotun‟s investment decision, which will be analyzed later. 
 
Malaysia‟s development can be considered both a challenge and an opportunity to 
Singapore (Kai-Sun 2001: 45). Singapore can invest and help TNCs to invest in 
Malaysia, but many Singaporeans regard Malaysia as a competitor (see Appendix 2 for 
a comparison of Malaysia and Singapore). Malaysia has experienced rapid growth at 
an annual rate of 8.6% since 1990 and manufacturing has been a major driving force. 
The manufacturing sector is driven by foreign companies. Major industries are 
electrical and electronic products; food, beverages and tobacco; and chemicals and 
chemical products – many of the same sectors as in Singapore. In addition, Malaysia 
has a number of incentives to offer companies; some examples are tax exemption, 
R&D allowance and tax deduction for export promotion. The manufacturing plants‟ 
operations are based on assembly, while design and research are undertaken 
elsewhere. Higher wage rates and geographical limitations have forced Singapore to 
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upgrade to higher value-added activities. The country can no longer remain an 
offshore manufacturing site for TNCs (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 46). Malaysia has emerged 
as a strong competitor in attracting manufacturing. The development of a large 
container port (Port Klang) that makes shipment of Malaysian exports via Singapore 
redundant, and the stock exchange in Kuala Lumpur that is several times larger than 
the one in Singapore, are other examples of business that might be drawn away from 
Singapore to Malaysia.  
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5. DESIGN, DATA AND METHOD 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the choice of design and to describe the 
method used to collect the data. Both the qualitative and the quantitative data and 
methods will be presented and discussed.  
5.1 Case 
The thesis is a case study of Norwegian FDI, more specifically, a case study of 
Norwegian FDI in Singapore. To find out why Norwegian companies decide to invest 
in Singapore, I have chosen a case study strategy (Yin 2003). Gerring‟s (2004: 342) 
definition of a case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. The unit of analysis is Norwegian FDI 
in Singapore, and by studying this case, I also hope to extend some of the findings to 
the broader class of Norwegian FDI.  
 
Norwegian FDI in Singapore is a spatially and time bounded phenomenon. It is not a 
new phenomenon, but the increasing scale of both Norwegian FDI in Singapore and 
outward Norwegian FDI in general is a recent development. Taking this into 
consideration, the study is limited to the time period from 1998 until today. In this 
study the primary unit of Norwegian FDI is broken down into subunits or within-unit 
cases as defined by Gerring (2004: 344). Such a strategy involves a change in level of 
analysis; from Norwegian FDI in Singapore to Norwegian companies investing in 
Singapore. To be able to answer the research question, I analyze the investment 
decisions of Norwegian companies. When determining what to observe, it is important 
to have variation on the dependent variable (King et al. 1994: 129). The dependent 
variable here is the investment decision. By selecting only on the basis of the 
dependent variable, one may end up with a type of selection bias where it is assumed 
that any characteristic the selected cases share is a cause (Geddes 2003: 92). To get 
variation on the dependent variable, I chose to investigate three companies‟ investment 
decisions where two decided to invest in Singapore, while the third company decided 
not to invest. 
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The selected firms‟ investments are analyzed in light of previously developed theory. 
The theory functions as a tool for interpreting the analysis (Andersen 1997:68). 
Singapore‟s policies and economy make up the context. There are many variables of 
interests; I have chosen to divide them into four categories to represent the economic 
and the political factors. By investigating different firms, I hope to be able to find out 
something about the cause of Norwegian FDI in Singapore, or in Yin‟s (2003: 32) 
words, I am aiming for analytic generalization. Three firms in different sectors have 
been analyzed for this purpose. These subunits offer both similar and contrasting 
situations; similar since the location evaluated for the investments are more or less the 
same, but different since the companies belong to distinct sectors where the most 
important factors for investing may differ. In case studies, there is always the danger 
of making faulty inferences; the relationships between variables within the selected set 
of cases may not reflect relationships in the entire population of cases (Geddes 2003: 
92). This is important to remember when trying to generalize both from the subunits to 
the case in question, and from the case of Norwegian FDI in Singapore to Norwegian 
FDI in general.  
 
Methodological and data triangulation are highly recommended by Yin (2003: 97) to 
improve reliability and validity. I have tried to include both in this study by analyzing 
descriptive statistics based on a data set, and carry out interviews combined with 
questionnaires. The two main data sources are interviews and documentation, in form 
of annual reports, press releases, news articles and other written material. The next 
sections will deal with this topic in-depth.  
 
5.2 Qualitative Data and Method 
 
Selection 
The selection of companies was based on five criteria:  
- Nationality 
- Investment location (Singapore) 
- Time of the investment decision  
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- Privately owned 
- Sector  
Based on the discussion in the previous section, the three first criteria had to be 
designed to include Norwegian companies investing in Singapore after 1998. I decided 
to focus on privately owned companies and not state owned companies. Much of the 
earlier research of Norwegian FDI has been done on privately owned companies, and 
this makes the results of my study easier to compare with earlier results and easier to 
compare the subunits of my case also. In addition, I was interested in getting 
companies from different sectors to be able to compare across sectors in the analysis.  
 
The selection involved quite a bit of research on the internet and in annual reports – 
the Norwegian Business Association Singapore has a very useful register of more or 
less all Norwegian companies in Singapore at their web site (NBAS 2009). The choice 
ultimately fell on Pareto, REC and Jotun. Why were these firms and these industries 
selected? Of course, the time perspective narrows the choices. First, by choosing these 
three companies both the secondary sector (manufacturing) was represented with REC 
and Jotun, and the tertiary sector (services) with Pareto. Since there is hardly any 
primary sector in Singapore, these companies reflect the industry and business in 
Singapore. Second, financial services account for a large share of global FDI stocks 
and flows. Norway stands out with a much smaller share of services accounting for 
outward FDI. Grünfeld (2005: 12) emphasizes that bank and insurance services 
dominate the FDI statistics in Europe, while constituting a very small part of 
Norwegian outward FDI. This lack of investment may be due to foreign ownership in 
the financial business in Norway. In Selfors‟(1999: 39)  study, the financial sector is 
not included.  Even though financial services are not typical Norwegian FDI, it is part 
of a global trend and deserves some attention.  Third, Norwegian FDI in 
manufacturing has been characterized by investments in the pulp and paper industry, 
ship building and chemical products. Jotun as a chemical company is part of the 
„traditional‟ pattern, while REC represents a new „high-tech‟ industry. It is interesting 
to take a closer look at what kind of interaction there is between these two 
manufacturing industries and Singapore as host country.   
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5.2.1 Interview 
In a case study, the interview is a very important source of information and it often 
takes the shape of a guided conversation (Yin 2003: 89). During March I conducted 
three interviews, one for each of the selected companies. Time, access and resources 
restricted my interviews to one person per company. This may be a weakness for the 
validity of the data, but, these persons were key informants. According to Yin (2003), 
key informants are critical of a study‟s success. The interviewees fulfilled the 
requirements about being both experienced and knowledgeable about the research 
problem (Rubin & Rubin 2005: 65). They all had a very solid background; 
experienced with a good overview of the business strategy and business model of the 
respective companies, and also in possession of extensive knowledge of the investment 
decisions (see Appendix 3 for detailed presentation of the informants). 
 
The interviews were focused or semi-structured interviews (Thagaard 2002: 85). The 
interview guide was based on the four categories presented in the theory chapter: 
economic factors, economic institutions, general policy and specific-sector policy (see 
Appendix 4). During the interviews, all the topics were covered even if the order was 
not always followed. This leads to flexibility and a better flow in the interview 
(Thagaard 2002). In line with Rubin & Rubin‟s (2005: 158) advice, I tried to avoid 
questions that encourage a yes-or-no answer and to focus on questions about how and 
what instead of the more abstract question of why. The interviews were not recorded, 
but thorough notes were taken. Recording has its advantages and disadvantages; no 
information is lost, but, some people find electronic recording distractive and obtrusive 
(Rubin and Rubin 2005: 111). In these interview situations I decided not to record in 
order to achieve trust and to have a conversation where the informants felt they could 
speak openly and freely. To minimize the inevitable loss of information, I always read 
the notes as soon as possible after the interviews and typed them out while memory 
was still fresh. In Pareto there were only one employee still working in the firm that 
had been involved in the investment decision, the CEO in Singapore. The interview 
was therefore done over the phone by making one introductory call, one interview call 
and one follow-up call. In addition, some follow-up questions were answered by mail.   
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Interviews are verbal reports that give targeted and insightful information, but they are 
subject to common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation. 
Bias can accrue from poorly constructed questions; there is always a risk of response 
bias and also of reflexivity. Reflexivity means that the interviewee only gives what the 
interviewer wants to hear (Yin 2003: 86, 90-92). As an interviewer, I tried to conduct 
the interviews in an unbiased and reliable way as described in the previous paragraphs. 
There is always the risk of poor recall, but because of the selection criteria, all of these 
decisions were made recently. The oldest one was Pareto‟s investment decision from 
2005/2006, followed by both REC and Jotun in 2007/2008. To strengthen the data, I 
tried to triangulate with other sources where possible. Especially REC received a lot of 
attention and therefore I could supplement with press releases and articles.  
 
During the interviews I received some confidential information about the companies, 
and I also had to take this into consideration when writing the analysis. The 
confidential information was not pivotal to the main factors I was investigating – it 
was information at a very detailed level which the companies did not want to make 
public. To protect the confidentiality, the informants reviewed the presentation of the 
company data. Another reason for reviewing was to strengthen the accuracy of the 
study (Yin 2003: 159). Essential facts and evidence are corroborated by letting the 
informants review the information. The comments I received were useful clarifications 
of facts and procedures. The informants spoke on behalf of the company, and, with 
permission, neither are anonymous. This is the most desirable option since the reader 
is able to recall any previous information about the case and because the case can be 
reviewed more readily (Yin 2003: 158). In the analysis, the interview data and my 
interpretation are presented in separate sections to enhance reliability. This allows the 
reader to draw his/her own conclusions on the basis of the interview data, at the same 
time as my interpretation is clearly distinguished from that of the informants.  
5.2.2 Questionnaire 
To triangulate data as recommended by Yin (2003), the interviews were combined 
with questionnaires. In this study, the questionnaire was only answered by those that 
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also were interviewed. Unfortunately, I did not get the opportunity to ask other 
employees in the companies about their assessment of the investment decisions, nor 
contact other companies to carry out a larger survey like Selfors (1999) did in her 
study. However, the respondents of the questionnaires occupy key positions in the 
companies and were fully capable of answering the questions. The respondents were 
asked to state the main reasons for investing and to rank 14 factors according to how 
important they were to the investment decision. The ranking made it easier to compare 
the different companies, and during the interviews, it was possible to follow up the 
answers and ask the informants for more information as basis for the analysis (Mordal 
1989: 41, 112).  The questionnaire became a useful complementary instrument to the 
interviews. 
 
The questionnaire is very short, it simply asks about the respondent‟s position in the 
company, role in the investment decision, the main motives for the investment, how 
they would describe the business climate in Singapore and ranking of 14 factors. The 
ranking question was inspired by Selfors‟ (1999) work. I expanded the number of 
questions about motives according to my own research question to include all four 
categories (economic factors, economic institutions, general policy and sector-specific 
policy). The market motive was divided in access to national and regional market 
because of Singapore‟s position as a regional center. The scale was divided into 0-4, 
where 0 meant no significance while 4 meant great significance for the investment 
decision (see Appendix 5).  
 
5.3 Quantitative Data and Method 
5.3.1 Quantitative Data: Collection and Classification 
The statistics on outward FDI stock has been compiled annually by Statistics Norway 
(SSB) since 1998 (SSB 2009a). The figures are based on a survey conducted by the 
Directorate of Taxes, and supplemented with and compared to information from 
annual accounts submitted to the Register of Company Accounts.  The survey covers 
foreign enterprises in which a Norwegian investor has direct ownership of 10 percent 
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or more of the equity, or indirect ownership of 50 percent or more. The definition of 
FDI is in line with international guidelines (SSB 2009a): “A direct investment is a 
cross-border investment where an investor intends to establish a long-term financial 
interest and exert an effective influence on the activities of the investment object.”  
 
The stock statistics on Norwegian direct investment in foreign countries cover 1,300 
Norwegian units, with investment in about 5,000 foreign objects. Industrial 
classification is in accordance with the revised Norwegian Standard for Industrial 
Classification (SN94) (SSB 2009b)
7
. Companies with businesses in several industries 
are grouped according to the activity that contributes the most to the company's overall 
value added. 
5.3.2 Quantitative Data: Sources of Error and Uncertainty 
There are several reliability and validity issues that might affect the analysis. The 
quality of the statistics is affected by the quality of the register, and the quality of the 
reported data (SSB 2009a). First, there is always the risk that completed forms contain 
errors. Second, errors may occur due to the processing of the data at SSB. Third, there 
may be non-response errors. The statistics are based on both SSB‟s data collection 
through surveys and company reports, but some entities might fail to conform to the 
reporting obligation
8
. Another difficulty with using surveys is that the format may lead 
to systematic biases in reporting. One example is underreporting of investment in tax 
havens (Hveem et al. 2008b: 33). Fourth, not all investments are registered. Full 
disclosure requirements only apply to comparatively high amounts, and this procedure 
is implemented to lessen the burden of reporting and processing.  
 
The most central data issue is related to the so-called “intermediate” affiliates, a 
problem emphasized by Hveem et al. (2008a and 2008b). UNCTAD recommends that 
FDI data should be compiled on the basis of ultimate host and home economy in 
addition to those on the immediate basis (WIR 2008: 7). Despite the recommendations, 
it is common practice to base the compilation on immediate host and home economy, 
                                              
7
 The standard is based on the EU industrial standard NACE Rev. 1 and UN Industrial Standard ISIC Rev. 3. 
8
 Missing values are coded as zero. 
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mostly due to feasibility. SSB gathers complementary data from annual reports to at 
least try to alleviate the problem. Still, this particular data problem will lead to a 
systematic bias in the statistics; it might look like a specific country is receiving a lot 
of Norwegian investment, but this is just a temporary stop on its way to the final 
destination.  This issue is taken into consideration in the analysis.  
5.3.3 Quantitative Method  
The data set includes all Norwegian outward FDI stocks to Singapore in the time 
period 1998 to 2006
9
. By using FDI stocks, the same investment project may be 
registered over several years. The data is at the firm level, anonymous, but sorted into 
different categories based on industry classification numbers. During the nine years in 
question, 873 cases of FDI stocks were registered. 135 of these investments were 
registered with the value zero
10
. In total, 738 investments or registered FDI stocks with 
a value other than zero were made by Norwegian companies in Singapore from 1998 
to 2006. The investments were divided into years, and for each year, in different 
categories according to the classification numbers. There were 61 categories, ranging 
from one decimal to three decimals, three decimals being the most detailed level. I 
chose to categorize the data into 26 main industries, corresponding to the industry 
classification numbers without decimals. The 26 industries were divided into 12 
sectors, and in the end, into three. For a comprehensive summary of the categorizing 
with the 26 industries as a basis, see Appendix 6
11
. When choosing how to categorize, 
it was important to balance practicality and the need for keeping companies 
anonymous. There are at least 130 Norwegian companies registered in Singapore.  
 
I chose to divide the industries into three sectors: manufacturing, services and 
“offshore”, including both shipping and oil activities. The offshore category is very 
suitable for Norway as an old shipping nation and a younger oil nation. In addition, the 
                                              
9
 The FDI stock statistics are calculated using the formula:  
FDI = Capital stock affiliate*(indirect + direct share of ownership for Norwegian parent) + net loans from parent 
to affiliate. 
10
 29 missing values were replaced with the value zero, in addition to the already existing 106 entries with the 
value zero. 
11
 It was only necessary to specify two categories further, namely number 35 and 71, by looking at the decimal 
specification of the Norwegian SN94.  
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12 subcategories are also presented thoroughly to be able to be even more specific 
about the Norwegian sector pattern in Singapore. The two sectors manufacture of 
paper and paper products and publishing, and post and telecommunications and 
computer and related activities were put together with regard to type of industries and 
anonymity. Both publishing and computer and related activities make up a very small 
part of their categories. 
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6. ANALYSIS  
In the following sections I will analyze the connection between theory and the four 
analytical categories presented earlier: economic factors, economic institutions, 
general policy and sector-specific policy. First, there will be a mostly descriptive 
analysis of Norwegian FDI to Singapore from 1998 to 2006. The results are presented 
in various graphs and tables, and the problem of transshipment countries discussed. 
Second, a brief presentation of the companies is required to get a better understanding 
of the different sectors and their priorities. Third, the results from the questionnaire is 
described and analyzed to form a preliminary impression of the companies‟ investment 
decisions. Fourth, all the analytical categories are analyzed in detail. The data for each 
company will be presented before the material is interpreted and seen in connection to 
theory, hypotheses and previous research. Last, there will be a review of the results; a 
summary of the hypotheses (see Table 6.5) and an assessment of the companies‟ main 
motives before returning to Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm and the interaction between 
home country, firms and host country.  
6.1 Statistics 
In 2006, Norwegian outward FDI reached NOK 754 billion, a 15% increase from 2005 
(SSB 2009a). Looking at the sector composition in 2006, other transport activities and 
post and telecommunications accounted for 15% of Norwegian FDI, oil and gas 
extraction 29% and manufacturing and mining industries 30%.  
6.1.1 Overall Norwegian FDI Pattern in Singapore 
Norwegian outward FDI increased 218% from 1998 to 2006 (SSB 2009a). The 
development of outward Norwegian FDI to Singapore has been even more impressive 
with an increase of 2,226%, almost 100% on average annually as seen in Table 6.1:  
 
Table 6.1: Norwegian FDI Stocks in Singapore 1998-2006 (in NOK billion) 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
FDI 
stocks 
2.633 1.527 12.429 20.397 11.739 17.265 24.509 40.121 61.249 191.872 
Annual 
increase 
- -42% 713% 64% -42% 47% 42% 64% 52% - 
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 Singapore received 8% of all Norwegian FDI in 2006, and 55% of the Norwegian FDI 
going to Asia (SSB 2009a). The development is illustrated in Figure 6.1: 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Norwegian FDI Stock in Singapore 1998-2006  
(in NOK billion) 
 
The investments decreased significantly from 1998 to 1999, and 2001 to 2002, which 
indicate that the investment climate was affected by the economic crises during these 
two time periods.  
6.1.2 Norwegian FDI Sector Pattern in Singapore 
As described in the previous chapter, the data were categorized into 12 and then three 
main sectors: offshore, manufacturing and services. The distribution of the three 
sectors is shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2. There has been large fluctuations in 
every sector‟s share from year to year; offshore reached a low of 15% in 2001 and a 
high of 62% in 1999, manufacturing made up only 1% of Norwegian FDI to Singapore 
in 2000 and 41% in 2002 and 2003, and services‟ share was 18% in 1998 and reached 
77% in 2000. It is particularly interesting to see that investments in services were 
particularly large in 2000 and 2001, but diminished with about 30 % in 2002 after the 
burst of the „dot-com bubble‟.  Still, it is hard to distinguish a very clear pattern of 
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investments in these three sectors since Norwegian investments usually are driven by a 
few large companies, which makes FDI vary considerably.  
 
Table 6.2: Norwegian FDI Stock in Singapore Divided in Three Sectors 
(in NOK billion and percentage in parentheses) 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
 
Offshore 
 
1.566 
(59) 
0.953 
(62) 
2.735 
(22) 
3.015 
(15) 
3.438 
(29) 
6.726 
(39) 
7.459 
(30) 
13.848 
(35) 
36.318 
(59) 
76.058 
(40) 
Manu- 
facturing 
 
0.604 
(23) 
0.036 
(2) 
0.135 
(1) 
5.312 
(26) 
4.806 
(41) 
7.154 
(41) 
7.957 
(32) 
13.663 
(34) 
12.661 
(21) 
52.328 
(27) 
 
Services 
 
0.464 
(18) 
0.538 
(35) 
9.559 
(77) 
12.070 
(59) 
3.496 
(30) 
3.386 
(20) 
9.093 
(37) 
12.611 
(31) 
12.270 
(20) 
63.486 
(33) 
Total 
 
2.633 1.527 12.429 20.397 11.739 17.265 24.509 40.121 61.249 191.872 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Norwegian FDI Stock in Singapore: Three Sectors 
 (in NOK billion)  
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According to Grünfeld (2005: 12), in 2001 the industry sector (manufacturing) 
constituted 40% of Norwegian FDI, oil 20% and services 40%. In Singapore, of total 
FDI throughout the whole period, offshore accounted for 40% of the investments (oil 
20%), manufacturing 27% and services 33%. The services category grows to 53% 
when including shipping, while manufacturing stays at 27%. Not surprisingly, the 
service category is quite large – Singapore is characterized as the transportation and 
communication hub of Southeast Asia. The service category is larger than the usual 
Norwegian average of 40%, but less than the global average of 62%. The heavy 
concentration of Norwegian firms in international shipping is exemplified in 
Norwegian FDI to Singapore.   
 
Table 6.3: Norwegian FDI Stock in Singapore Divided in Twelve Sectors 
 (in NOK billion) 
Sectors 
Total FDI 
1998-2006 
Percent Total FDI 
1998-2006 
Oil and gas extraction and affiliated services 
 
37.364 19.5 
Manufacture of paper and paper products, and 
publishing 
36.654 19.1 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
 
7.666 4.0 
Manufacture of metal and metal products 
 
0.238 0.1 
Manufacture of machines and instruments, food 
products and beverages and other manuf. industry 
7.028 3.7 
Oil platform and shipbuilding industry 
 
0.742 0.4 
Construction and infrastructure (electricity, gas and 
water supply) 
2.723 1.4 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, excluding motor 
vehicles 
0.715 0.4 
Shipping (water transport and travel agency activities) 
 
38. 694 20.2 
Post and telecommunications, and computer and related 
activities 
56. 228 29.3 
Financial services 
 
0.832 0.4 
Other business activities 
 
2.988 1.6 
Total 
 
191. 872 100.00 
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There are four major sector „drivers‟ of investment in Singapore: oil and gas extraction 
and affiliated services, manufacture of paper and paper products and publishing, 
shipping, and post and telecommunications and computer and related activities (see 
Table 6.3 and a detailed overview in Appendix 7). In the period 1998-2006, these 
constituted 88% of all Norwegian FDI stock in Singapore. The dominating sectors are 
more or less the same as in Grünfeld‟s (2005:12) article; he underlines the investment 
importance of industries like paper and pulp, ship building, oil and gas, chemical 
products, shipping and telecommunication. Hveem et al. (2008a) find that the 
petroleum sector‟s share in 2005 of Norwegian FDI stocks was 33%, in Singapore this 
number is 20%. It is also worth noticing that shipping experienced a substantial 
increase in investment recently, from NOK five billion in 2005 to NOK 22 billion in 
2006, more than 1/3 of all Norwegian investments to Singapore in 2006 (see Figure 
6.3). On the other hand, the smallest sectors are manufacture of metal and metal 
products, oil platform and shipbuilding industry, wholesale trade and commission 
trade (excluding motor vehicles) and financial services. These four sectors comprise 
only 1.3% of Norwegian FDI stock throughout the whole period.  
 
Figure 6.3: Norwegian FDI Stock in Singapore: The Four Largest Sectors 
(in NOK billion) 
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All of the major investment sectors in Singapore follow the Norwegian pattern. With 
29%, telecommunications has the largest share of total FDI in Singapore in the period 
1998-2006. The investment in telecommunications decreased significantly in 2002 and 
2003, but has increased steadily the last couple of years. The new global trend of 
increasing FDI in other services like infrastructure is also demonstrated in Norwegian 
FDI to Singapore. The share of construction and infrastructure is 1.4% of total FDI 
1998-2006. Investments in infrastructure make up the major part of this sector, and the 
first investments occurred in 2004 (see Appendix 7). During three years NOK 2.7 
billion was invested in this sector.  
 
All in all, the investments in Singapore follow the usual Norwegian pattern of oil, 
manufacturing and shipping. The shipping industry has a long history in Singapore, the 
city became a central port for Norwegian ships already in the 1890s (Gisnås 1995: 70). 
The largest problem with the data is the one of „transshipment‟ countries, mentioned 
briefly in the introduction. According to Hveem et al. (2008a: 8): “The feature of 
intermediary affiliates, coordination centres and others, further channeling investment 
to a final destination, is not restricted to the oil sector, and may give a misleading 
picture of investment patterns”. It is very hard to say anything about the amount of 
Norwegian capital that might flow from Singapore to its final investment destination. 
Intermediary affiliates are very common in the oil business, and this might also be the 
case for the other three dominant Norwegian sectors in Singapore. Many Norwegian 
shipping companies have offices in Singapore. Another example is the 
telecommunication sector. In Singapore, this sector has a market penetration of about 
100% in all types of telecommunication services (IDA 2009). In addition, the market 
is dominated by two large companies, the state owned enterprise SingTel and the 
competitor StarHub (Rodan 2001: 157). Singapore is therefore not an easy market to 
enter for foreign telecommunication companies. On the other hand, one of Singapore‟s 
goals has been to become both a regional and a global financial center (Rodan 2001). 
The role of transshipment country may be a consequence of Singapore‟s industrial 
policy, together with attracting TNCs‟ regional headquarters. Based on the statistical 
results, it seems reasonable to assume that Singapore is a preferred intermediate host 
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economy for Norwegian capital flowing into Asia, maybe even a gateway for 
Norwegian FDI to the region.   
 
6.2 Company presentations 
6.2.1 Pareto Securities 
Pareto was founded in 1986. Since then the company has become the Pareto Group 
with head office in Oslo and offices in Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, Kristiansand, 
Bryne and in Singapore (Pareto 2008). Pareto also cooperates with Nordic Partners 
Inc., a partly-owned stockbroking company in New York, and has a total of 365 
employees. The operating revenue for the Pareto Group was NOK 3.5 billion in 2007, 
an increase from NOK 3.3 billion in 2006.  Pareto‟s aim is “to be the preferred, 
Norwegian supplier of financial services, based on thorough and detailed knowledge 
of Norwegian social conditions and businesses and industries in which Norway has 
particular advantage” (Pareto 2008).  
 
Pareto Securities AS is part of the Pareto Group; its area of business is share and bond 
broking and financial counseling. The operating revenue for Pareto Securities was 
NOK 2.5 billion in 2007 and international clients accounted for over 50% of the 
revenue. Pareto Securities Asia Pte. Ltd., domicile in Singapore, is a subsidiary of 
Pareto Securities which has an ownership share of 62.5%
12
. The company offers 
advisory services to local companies and Norwegian expatriate players in Singapore, 
mostly in shipping and offshore (Pareto 2008). The official decision about establishing 
an office in Singapore was taken in January 2006 after a few months of internal 
discussion in Pareto Securities in 2005 (Leivdal 2009 [telephone interview]). The size 
of the investment was relatively small, a few million NOK. In 2006 there were two 
employees in Singapore, in 2007 six employees and in 2009 the number has risen to a 
staff of 11.  
                                              
12
 Pareto AS is owned by four Norwegian investors. Pareto AS owns 75% of Pareto Securities, which again owns 
62.5% of its subsidiary in Singapore (Pareto 2008: 27).  
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6.2.2 Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) 
The corporation was established as a Norwegian private limited company in 1996 with 
the name “Fornybar Energi AS”, and in 2000 the new holding company REC was 
formed  (REC 2008a, REC 2007b)
 13
. The REC Group has its headquarters in Oslo, 
and it has six production facilities and owns 1/3 of the solar company EverQ in 
Germany.  There are three production facilities in Norway (Herøya, Narvik and 
Glomfjord), one in Sweden and two in the United States that employ about 1,795 
people in total. The company also has a smaller operation in South Africa. The REC 
Group revenue rose from NOK 4.3 billion in 2006 to NOK 6.6 billion in 2007, an 
increase of 53%. Interim results indicate that the company is experiencing further 
growth in 2008. The expected revenue will be approximately NOK 8.2 billion (REC 
2008c). REC‟s vision is to be “The world‟s leading provider of highly-competitive 
solar energy solutions” (REC 2008a).  
 
REC is an integrated solar company with operations throughout the value chain: 
- REC Silicon produces silicon materials mainly for the photovoltaic (PV) 
industry and for some electronic customers.  
- REC Wafer produces multi- and monocrystalline wafers for the PV industry, 
and the wafers are made of the silicon material produced by REC Silicon.  
- Wafers are again used by REC Solar to produce solar cells and modules.  
REC follows a business to business model (B2B), and this is reflected in the different 
divisions‟ shares of gross revenue: Silicon has a 31% share, Wafer 55% and Solar 
14%. REC Wafer is the world‟s largest producer of multicrystalline wafers, and these 
are sold to other producers of solar cells and modules. The PV market grew 62% in 
2007 and four countries represented 86% of global PV demand – Germany accounted 
for 47% of the demand, followed by Spain, Japan and USA. Other key markets are 
Italy, France, South Korea and India (REC 2008a). To stay ahead, REC is intensifying 
R&D to create technological advances that lead to lower unit costs and cost efficiency 
in new expansion projects. Since the solar energy market has grown at a very high rate 
                                              
13
 The majority of REC shares are Norwegian owned: Elkem AS (23.45%), Orkla ASA (16.28) and Hafslund 
Venture AS (14.24%).  Orkla owns a total of 39.73% of REC through Elkem AS.  
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the last years, the company has been in an expansionist mode (Wahlstrøm 2009 
[interview]). In 2007, there was no more production capacity, and REC started looking 
into the possibility of building a new manufacturing complex that was eventually 
described by CEO Erik Thorsen as: “… a critical project for our success and future 
because this complex, when fully completed, will have a bigger capacity than all of 
our current capabilities in our various fields combined today" (EDB 2007).  
 
25 October 2007 REC published a press release stating that Singapore had been 
chosen as location for a new manufacturing complex. The next day the company 
organized a press conference presenting the new solar site where Singapore was 
described as “the ideal balance between financial return, risks and future 
opportunities” (REC 2007a, 2007b). The Singapore complex will produce wafers, cells 
and modules. The selection process had taken nine months with a screening of 200 
possible locations in 18 countries on three continents; Europe, America and Asia. This 
was followed by due diligence of 20 locations and final negotiations with a handful of 
sites. Towards the end of the process, a team consisting of experts from areas such as 
engineering, infrastructure, HR and economy travelled to different locations to choose 
the main finalists (Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). The project received a lot of 
attention. The final investment decision was released 18 June 2008 with an estimate of 
NOK 13 billion and production start set to early 2010 (REC 2008b). By the time of the 
investment decision, the whole project was planned, and “…REC broke new ground 
two days after the proceedings, or maybe before” (Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]).  
6.2.3 Jotun 
In 1920, Odd Gleditsch opened a paint distributor‟s shop in Sandefjord and became a 
supplier to the whaling fleets in the region, and six years later he founded Jotun 
Kemiske Fabrik A/S (Jotun 2009b). Already in 1962 Jotun started production abroad 
with a plant in Libya. The first factory in the Far East was established in 1968 in 
Thailand. Towards the end of the 1960s, Odd Gleditsch Jr. acted as the initiator behind 
the merger of the four largest paint companies in Norway. The Jotun Group was thus 
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established in January 1972
14
. Today, head office is still located in Sandefjord and the 
group has 71 companies and 40 production facilities on all continents, and is 
represented in more than 70 countries through agents, branch offices and distributors 
(Jotun 2009a). The Jotun group has four divisions with responsibility for specific 
products, segments and geographical areas: Dekorativ, Paints, Coatings and Powder 
Coatings. The number of employees is 7,200 and in 2008 Jotun‟s revenue reached 
NOK 11.7 billion. 
 
Jotun claims to adhere to the strategy of organic growth (Jotun 2009a)
15
. The strategy 
may be different depending on the country, but the process follows a similar pattern: 
the starting point is usually the company‟s strong presence in the shipping industry. 
Agencies are established to serve the customers in the developing marine coating 
market. This result in Jotun sales offices and/or small production facilities, and when 
demand rises, new and large production facilities are built on site (Jotun 2009a). The 
company also prefers to have a 100% ownership of its affiliates, except for those 
countries where the government requires shared ownership. In the interview, Mr. 
Lunde (2009) emphasized organic growth as one of Jotun‟s strengths and the key to 
the company‟s success abroad; “We (Jotun) do not have a tradition for M&As”.  
 
Jotun‟s Singapore operations belong to the division Jotun Coatings. The division is 
responsible for the marine and protective coatings markets and also serves some local 
decorative markets (Jotun 2009a). Jotun Coatings had about 3,000 employees in 2008 
and a revenue of NOK 5.56 billion. The largest sales segment in Jotun Coatings is 
without doubt marine coatings with 66%, while protective coatings take a share of 
29% and decorative 5%. Operations in Singapore were established in 1971 and the 
subsidiary is 100% owned by the parent company. It began as a sales office servicing 
customers from the marine industry, and as demand increased for the company‟s 
products, mainly in the shipping industry, a paint factory was built in 1976 (NBAS 
                                              
14
 Jotun is a Norwegian owned and family owned company; the largest shareholdes are Orkla with 42.5%  and 
Jotun with 54%  (Jotun 2009a).  
15
 In 2000, Nina Minde wrote the report“Dunning‟s Eclectic Paradigm applied on Jotun Thailand” where she 
analyzes Jotun‟s organic growth strategy in Thailand in 1968.  
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2009). The factory, serving both the local and some foreign markets, went through an 
expansion in 1991 to increase production capacity. Jotun Singapore has played a major 
part in the company‟s regional expansion; Hong Kong, Korea and China were served 
from Singapore until it was time to establish a local presence. The Singapore office 
and factory has also been pivotal in building up competence in Indonesia, Vietnam and 
India.  
 
In Jotun‟s annual report 2006, further investments were expected in the subsequent 
year, including a factory expansion in Singapore (Jotun 2007). In the company‟s 
annual report 2007, the project had changed; instead of a factory expansion, a new 
plant for deliveries to Singapore was envisioned (Jotun 2007). During 2008 Jotun 
decided to invest in a new production facility in Malaysia to be ready by the year 2010 
(Lunde 2009 [interview] and Jotun 2009a). Construction is set to start in 2009 and the 
company is investing about NOK 200 million in the project. When finished, the 
facility‟s capacity will be larger than the factory in Singapore and the old factory in 
Malaysia combined. Production at the factory in Singapore will be reduced gradually 
and in the end closed down. Jotun will continue its presence in Singapore by leasing a 
new area, so-called reclaimed land in Jurong
16
. The new function of Jotun Singapore 
will be as a warehouse, sales office and transportation hub, including regional 
managers and a general manager (Lunde 2009 [interview]). 
 
6.3 Results Questionnaire 
The key informants ranked 14 economic and political factors by answering a short 
questionnaire (see Appendix 5). The first seven questions describe the economic 
factors in Singapore, the four next ones focus on general and sector-specific policy, 
while the last two questions are about economic institutions. The scale was 0-4; 0 
meaning no significance, 1 small significance, 2 some significance, 3 considerable 
significance and 4 great significance. It is important to remember that the questions 
were related to the firms‟ view of the different conditions in Singapore and how they 
                                              
16
 Land reclamation is the creation of new land, and part of Jurong is reclaimed land. In addition, Singapore has 
created Jurong Island, a center for oil, petrochemical and chemical industries.  
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had been of significance for deciding to invest. In the case of Jotun, conditions in both 
Singapore and Malaysia were ranked. Most of the conditions were taken into account 
when deciding to invest, but the ranking emphasizes the most important conditions for 
each company.  
 
Table 6.4: Company Rank of Economic and Political Factors in Singapore 
 Pareto 
Singapore 
REC 
Singapore 
Jotun 
Singapore 
Jotun 
Malaysia 
Access to national market 
 
4 1 2 4 
Access to regional market 
 
4 2 3 1 
Access to suppliers and/or cooperative 
partners 
1 3 3 3 
Access to lower-cost labor 
 
0 2 1 1 
Access to skilled labor 
 
0 4 3 3 
Access to lower-cost inputs 
 
0 3 2 2 
High quality infrastructure (transport and 
communication) 
1 4 3 3 
Advantageous tax policy and regulations 
 
0 3 1 1 
Advantageous sector-specific policies 
 
1 3 0 1 
Access to knowledge, technology and 
R&D 
0 3 3 3 
Control of corruption 
 
3 1 3 3 
Security of investment property to 
expropriation and property related crime 
0 3 1 2 
Bureaucratic efficiency 
 
0 3 3 3 
Regulatory ease of establishing 
operations in Singapore (or Malaysia) 
0 3 3 3 
 
Pareto ranked access to markets the highest, both national and regional, and control of 
corruption was second in importance when deciding to invest. REC ranked several 
conditions in Singapore very high, but the most important ones were access to skilled 
labor and high quality infrastructure. In contrast to Pareto, market access to the 
national market was of small significance to REC and access to the regional market of 
some significance. Jotun‟s rankings of Singapore and Malaysia are very similar – the 
largest difference is the great significance of access to the national market in Malaysia, 
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whereas access to the regional market gets a higher score in Singapore. On the basis of 
these answers, Pareto and Jotun‟s investment motives were primarily market-oriented, 
while REC‟s motive was asset-oriented (Dunning 2001, Dicken 2007). As pointed out 
by several researchers, market access seems to be the main motive for Norwegian FDI 
(Selfors 1999, Benito et al. 2002 and Heum 2004, Hveem et al. 2008b). In addition, all 
three investments can be classified as horizontal FDI; the establishment of a new 
production plant or office abroad. Even though asset-oriented motives are more 
prominent in vertical FDI, REC is one example of asset-oriented motive in horizontal 
FDI (Schatz and Venables 2000).  
 
Norwegian FDI has not been as oriented towards M&As as the OECD average; a 
larger share of FDI has gone to greenfield investments (Grünfeld 2005). Both Jotun‟s 
and REC‟s investments are greenfield projects. This pattern is exemplified in Jotun‟s 
strategy of organic growth and fully owned subsidiaries. Mr. Lunde (2009 [interview]) 
made it very clear during the interview that M&As were not part of Jotun‟s tradition, 
and the company has had some bad experiences with M&As. All of the investments 
can also be classified as operational internationalization and not strategic 
internationalization (Benito et al. 2002). Still, there is a future possibility that REC will 
expand operations in Singapore to also include strategic activity as R&D. Aside from 
the new plant, Jotun has already established a regional R&D facility in Malaysia.  
 
In the next sections, the data from the interviews are presented together with an 
interpretation based on both the interview data and the questionnaire rankings.  
 
6.4 Economic Factors 
The first category of localization advantages is made up of the more typical factors 
comprising both market and asset oriented motives (Dunning 1980, Dicken 2007).  
These location factors, with maybe market size being the exception, are often 
influenced by policies (see Figure 2.1). A total of seven hypotheses were presented:  
I: A large market size will have a positive effect on FDI. 
II: A highly educated work force will have a positive effect on FDI. 
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III: Low wages will have a positive effect on FDI. 
IV: A highly unionized work force will have a negative impact on FDI. 
V: Access to suppliers will have a positive effect on FDI. 
VI: A low level of investment will have a positive effect on FDI. 
VII: A well developed infrastructure will have a positive effect on FDI 
6.4.1 Pareto 
At the beginning of the interview, it became clear that Pareto had not even considered 
establishing an office anywhere else in Asia – Singapore was the only alternative 
because of the city‟s function as a communication center for Asia and as a center for 
Pareto‟s clients (Leivdal 2009 [telephone interview])17. Both the national and the 
regional market were therefore of interest to the firm. Pareto‟s main clients are large 
companies operating in the shipping, oil and offshore industries, and most of these 
firms have offices in Singapore. Pareto‟s Singapore office has 11 employees: six 
Europeans, four of whom are Norwegian and five Singaporeans. According to Mr. 
Leivdal (2009 [telephone interview]) there are many highly educated people in 
Singapore, but there is a problem getting labor that functions well within the company 
due to cultural differences. Pareto has a very flat structure, and the daily management 
is quite different from the local companies. Workers with education from a Western 
country are more easily adapted into Pareto‟s corporate culture. For recent graduates, 
wages are more or less the same as in Norway. Singaporeans with seven to 10 years of 
experience actually have a higher wage level than in Norway, bonuses not included 
(Leivdal 2009 [telephone interview]). 
 
There is a high level of investment in Singapore, especially within property, banking 
and finance (Leivdal 2009 [telephone interview]). On the other hand, these are not 
areas of focus to Pareto – the company concentrates its business in corporate finance 
(financial counseling). Concerning property, Pareto was able to get an office in 
Raffle‟s Place, an ordinary commercial business building downtown. Mr. Leivdal 
(2009 [telephone interview]) described Singapore as a hub in Asia; it is possible to 
                                              
17
 From now on Pareto will be short for Pareto Securities.  
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travel everywhere by going through Singapore; to the Philippines, Australia etc. The 
infrastructure in general is very good, and the air travel opportunities “fantastic”. Even 
though Pareto is situated in Singapore, there is quite a bit of travelling around the 
region for some of the employees.  
6.4.2 REC 
According to Mr. Wahlstrøm (2009 [interview]), Singapore‟s national market was not 
a decisive factor to REC, neither was the regional market. REC does have Asian 
customers, especially from Japan, China and Taiwan, but transportation costs are not 
very high. In the long term though, Asia may become an increasingly important 
market, and then it will be an advantage to have a regional presence. The new 
manufacturing complex in Singapore requires a work force of about 1,100, of which 
the majority is local or regional workers along with 40-50 Norwegians.  REC focused 
on three labor characteristics when considering investing: skills, cost and turnover 
(Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). The financial crisis caused an abundance of skilled 
labor; REC received 6,000 applications from well qualified workers. Only in 
Singapore, there is a pool of about 90,000 workers in the semiconductor industry with 
relevant experience, many of them working for TNCs. Access to skilled workers is of 
great significance. On the other hand, Singapore is not a low-cost labor country, but 
skilled labor is cheaper than in Norway (Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). The turnover 
level is also important; it reflects how many superfluous workers a company has at any 
given time. In Singapore the turnover level is 10 to 20% a year, lower than in many 
other countries in the region. REC also met the union leader together with other 
representatives from the government in order to get to know the labor politics and the 
system.  
 
The solar energy industry is new to Singapore, but has some similarities to the 
semiconductor industry (Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). In addition to exploiting 
suppliers already in Singapore, REC wanted to bring their own suppliers, and these 
were incorporated in the negotiations with the authorities. Raw materials to be used in 
the new factory will be imported. Mr. Wahlstrøm (2009 [interview] and the rest of the 
team working on the investment decision were worried about the market situation 
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when entering Singapore, especially the large investment and activity in the 
construction industry. However, the financial crisis dampened the activity and made it 
easier to get the construction workers necessary for developing the site. The 
construction industry in Singapore is extremely efficient, and timing was crucial to 
REC; regarding the production start, the sooner the better (Wahlstrøm 2009 
[interview]). 
 
Singapore is known for being a logistics hub; transportation in and out of the country 
is not a problem (Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). Infrastructure is well developed, but it 
is a very small country. REC is leasing an area of one square kilometer from the 
government. Mr. Wahlstrøm (2009 [interview]) points out that the area is 
approximately 1/600 of Singapore.  The factory site is situated in Tuas View in West 
Singapore, a 30 minute drive from the city center. The government offers basic needs 
like electricity and water. About half of the area will be developed by 2010; this 
includes the manufacturing complex, infrastructure, support facilities and an on-site 
supplier park (REC 2008a). The rest is space reserved for future R&D activities and 
manufacturing facilities.  
6.4.3 Jotun 
Jotun established operations in Singapore first and foremost because of the shipping 
industry and the city‟s status as a regional center (Lunde 2009 [interview], NBAS 
2009).  Operations were extended to protective coating (offshore) and to decorative 
paints. Due to maintenance of oilrigs from the whole region, the large oil companies 
are important customers. The decorative market in Singapore is very small compared 
to the national market in Malaysia where Jotun is a major player. Lunde (2009 
[interview]) stated that there are many highly educated workers in Singapore, meaning 
those with a Bachelor‟s and Master‟s degree from university. Skilled labor is sought-
after and there are numerous TNCs in Singapore, many of them well known and more 
popular as an employer than Jotun. Social status is very important in Asia, and to get 
the skilled labor one is looking for may be a challenge (Lunde 2009 [interview]). High 
skilled labor is very expensive; they require high wages and benefits and top 
management can be more expensive than expatriates. The regular worker wages in 
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Singapore are also relatively high compared to the rest of the region, but not 
“enormously”. The union in Singapore has also been an active part in Jotun‟s 
Singapore operations and was thoroughly informed when the decision about closing 
down the factory was made. The union has a history of good cooperation with the 
manufacturing industry (Lunde 2009 [interview]).  
 
Jotun is very acknowledged in the consumer market in Malaysia. It is easier to keep 
the workers, wages are lower and access to skilled labor with university education is 
also good (Lunde 2009 [interview]).  There is a platform of education and experience 
in Malaysia which is very useful to Jotun. Many of the workers have received training 
in Japanese and European industry culture, and “these factors should not be 
underestimated” according to Lunde (2009 [interview]). It is easy to import raw 
material to both Singapore and Malaysia, but there are also some local suppliers in 
Malaysia. In addition, many of Jotun‟s regular suppliers have factories in Malaysia.  
 
The infrastructure in Singapore has been considered well developed for many years. 
Already 20 years ago the transportation sector was very efficient, especially the IT 
system of the Singapore port. “Singapore is incredibly efficient, they have to be to 
survive” (Lunde (2009 [interview]). Malaysia‟s infrastructure was not that impressive 
20 years ago. Now however, “the infrastructure in Kuala Lumpur is amazing compared 
to how it used to be” (Lunde 2009 [interview]). Transportation opportunities between 
the two countries have improved because of the new highway between Kuala Lumpur 
and Singapore, and the Second Link bridge connection that opened in 1998. Access to 
land is very different in the two countries. In Singapore, most companies have to lease 
land from the government, but in Malaysia land can be purchased by foreign investors 
and Jotun owns the property where the new facility is being built. Before the 
investment decision, there was no surplus capacity left in either of Jotun‟s factories in 
Singapore and Malaysia, and a new production plant became necessary (Lunde 2009 
[interview]). It was not possible with further expansion on the same property in 
Singapore. The Singapore government offered Jotun new land to lease, and about the 
same time, the government decided to build a monorail which is to pass straight by 
70 
 
Jotun‟s old factory site. This meant that a restructuring would have to take place, and 
Mr. Lunde (2009 [interview]) described the monorail project as “a catalyst” in the 
company‟s decision about whether or not to build a new facility in Singapore. Other 
advantages related to building one big factory are cost savings, better flexibility and a 
higher service level (Lunde 2009 [interview]). 
6.4.4 Interpretation  
Access to market was of great significance to both Pareto and Jotun‟s investments as 
described in the questionnaire section. The regional market may become more 
important to REC in the future. Access to skilled labor was especially important to the 
investment decisions of the two manufacturing companies. It seems like the companies 
separate between multiple levels of skilled labor and wage costs in Singapore. 
Singaporeans with university education and considerable experience, often part of the 
top management, have higher salaries than compared with expatriates in the same 
position. Wages for skilled labor in Singapore is lower than for example in Norway, 
but higher compared to the region and higher than in Malaysia. All agreed that there is 
no lack of highly qualified labor in Singapore. In addition, the manufacturing 
companies have both experienced good cooperation with the unions in Singapore.  
 
Krugman (1994) described the industrialization of Singapore as an impressive 
mobilization of resources. The mobilization included getting more people into the 
work force and upgrading the education system. Today, the labor participation rate is 
about 65% in Singapore with 34% working in professional and technical jobs (EDB 
2009). Workers are praised for their strict discipline and work ethics, and the 
government is flexible in immigration rules and in importing foreign labor (Kai-Sun et 
al. 2001: 15). The manufacturing sector has a large demand for technicians and 
engineers, and the education system is biased towards technical training. There are two 
universities and four polytechnics, all six institutions funded by the government. In 
1995, 59% of the graduates were technology graduates from engineering, science and 
computer studies (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 20-22). Besides education and training, 
importation of labor is common. TNCs are allowed to bring in experienced managers 
and a large number of low-skilled workers have been imported to carry out menial 
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work. Many low skilled workers in Singapore are from Malaysia (Lunde 2009 
[interview]). The unions in Singapore are highly fragmented and tightly controlled by 
the government (Pinkney 2005: 134). There are 70 registered employees‟ trade unions, 
three employer unions and a federation of employee trade union, the NTUC (the 
National Trade Union Congress). The NWC (the National Wages Council) advises the 
government on wage policies, and the council is made up of representatives from the 
government, employers groups and trade unions (EDB 2009). Both the NTUC and the 
NWC are organizations that were established in the 1960s and early 1970s to promote 
the industrialization of Singapore, and they are still of great importance.  The 
consequence of this system is that unions are locked into a corporate bargaining 
process, leaving little room for independent action (Pinkney 2005).  
 
Hveem et al. (2008b) found that a large domestic market significantly attracts 
Norwegian FDI. Numerous empirical studies have shown that market size has a very 
strong and positive effect on FDI (Navaretti et al. 2004: 141). It is also worth noticing 
that the degree of similarity of the home and host country GDP has a positive impact 
on the volume of multinational activity, and Norway and Singapore have about the 
same GDP per capita (see Appendix 1). Access to a large market as described in 
hypotheses I, has affected the three companies investigated here positively, especially 
Pareto and Jotun. Countries with a large percentage of highly educated individuals and 
a low wage level also seem to attract Norwegian FDI (Hveem et al. 2008b). Krugman 
(1998: 15) points out that market-size effect may not be as important a source of 
agglomeration, at least in urban areas. Big cities, like for instance Singapore, may 
instead be sustained by increasing returns because of thick labor markets. Hiring 
skilled workers is one way of getting access to knowledge. In REC‟s case there was 
definitely a thick labor market with 90,000 potential and experienced workers from the 
semiconductor industry. Navaretti et al. (2004) expect HFDI to be larger the more 
similar host and home countries are, and vice versa for VFDI.  When taking into 
consideration that the companies in question decided to invest to reap the benefits of a 
large skilled work force and these workers‟ relatively low wage level compared to 
other countries – the hypotheses about the positive effects of a highly educated work 
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force and a low wage level on Norwegian FDI fit the data in this study. It is harder to 
reach a conclusion concerning hypotheses IV; a highly unionized work force will have 
a negative impact on FDI. The union system in Singapore is very fragmented and the 
government keeps strict control. Hveem et al. (2008b) measure labor rights by the 
number of ratified ILO conventions
18
. They find that labor rights seem to attract 
Norwegian FDI, but this result is not robust in all models and the results from other 
empirical studies have also been mixed. At least, a highly unionized work force does 
not pose an obstacle to investments in Singapore. Nevertheless, one cannot say for 
certain that the union system in Singapore has a positive effect either.  
 
It is interesting to note that Jotun and REC, both manufacturing companies, rated 
access to suppliers as being of considerable significance. This specific question was 
probably not as relevant to Pareto since it operates in the financial services sector. 
Access to suppliers and cooperative partners is also connected to the new economic 
geography and different agglomeration and cluster advantages.  According to Porter 
(2000), suppliers of specialized inputs, components, machinery and services are 
important elements in a cluster. The role of cluster will be discussed more thoroughly 
in the section about sector-specific policy, but access to suppliers has a positive effect 
on the companies analyzed here.  The general high level of investment in Singapore 
does not seem to have had a negative impact on the investing companies, but it is hard 
to tell since the companies actually have decided to invest. Singapore has been 
attracting FDI since the 1960s and the investment level has become quite high with 
inward FDI stock reaching $225 billion (see Appendix 1). According to Solow (1956), 
a high level of capital stock in a country will reduce marginal returns to investment 
and therefore the willingness to invest. Nevertheless, this is based on maximization of 
profits, and there are many ways of maximizing profits. As discussed above in 
connection with access to suppliers, a high level of investment may be an indication of 
an existing cluster that may lead to many advantages and opportunities for making a 
profit.  
 
                                              
18
 Singapore has ratified 3 out of 4 ILO conventions after 1998 (ILO 2009).  
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The last hypothesis deals with the infrastructure. Again, there seems to be sector-
specific differences between the Norwegian firms; the manufacturing companies rank 
high quality infrastructure as being of great or considerable significance in the 
questionnaire. Pareto considered this as being of small significance for their 
investment decision. Infrastructure has been a prioritized area for a long time by the 
Singapore government, but Malaysia had done impressive progress the last years (Kai-
Sun et al. 2001, Lunde 2009 [interview]). Port Klang was mentioned as a possible 
competitor to the Singapore port. During the interviews, Singapore was described as a 
logistics hub with fantastic travel opportunities, even by Pareto. Another element 
related to infrastructure, not included in the questionnaire, is access to land. Yet again, 
Pareto stands out. The financial company only needed office space as opposed to Jotun 
and REC that needed sizeable areas of land for production facilities. Land is scarce in 
Singapore, and, REC‟s representative stated that “Land is not for free in Singapore” 
(Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). The situation was not optimal, but REC decided to 
invest in Singapore. Contrary to REC, access to land in Singapore was one reason 
contributing to Jotun‟s decision about investing in Malaysia and not in Singapore. All 
in all, the high quality infrastructure of Singapore has had a positive effect on 
Norwegian FDI. At the same time, the limited access to land may cause future 
problems in attracting manufacturing facilities, but this is also dependent on the 
prioritizing and industrial policy of the government in Singapore.  
 
6.5 Economic Institutions 
Doing business in a foreign country entails certain transaction costs or information 
costs for a company. According to North (1990), institutions play a major role in the 
performance of an economy. The second set of hypotheses was related to economic 
institutions:  
VIII: A system characterized by enforcement of property rights, rule of law and 
of control of corruption and crime will have a positive effect on FDI.  
IX: An efficient bureaucracy will have a positive effect on FDI.  
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6.5.1 Pareto 
Mr. Leivdal (2009 [telephone interview]) emphasized: “We (Pareto) experience 
Singapore as extremely safe”. Documentation and adherence to rules and regulations 
are very important in Singapore, even more than in Norway. There are larger problems 
regarding these issues right outside Singapore in countries like Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. Pareto therefore tries to do most business in Singapore. The 
banks must be comfortable with the company‟s business partners. For example, a 
company may have operations in Indonesia, but it must be registered in Singapore or 
some other trustworthy countries where there is rule of law and little corruption 
(Leivdal 2009 [telephone interview]). Property rights on the other hand are not that 
important to Pareto; the company only rents an office space in town and their financial 
services do not include land in Singapore, but rather fixed assets as oil rigs.  
 
Singapore‟s bureaucracy is “…very goal oriented, very efficient, very rigid, but very 
inclined to change routines if necessary. It is an advantageous behavior” (Leivdal 2009 
[telephone interview]). Pareto is regularly in touch with the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS). There is a large degree of documentation and reporting – the 
company has to deliver monthly and quarterly reports, and often call and have 
meetings with the MAS. The reporting corresponds to a half a full-time position. This 
may seem excessive, but Mr. Leivdal (2009 [telephone interview]) considered the 
reporting to be in the company‟s long term interest. 
6.5.2 REC 
Corruption, crime and property rights were evaluated by REC at an early stage by 
making use of the embassy and Innovation Norway‟s knowledge of Singapore. It is 
essential for REC to be in a system characterized by stability and transparency 
(Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]). Singapore is considered by many as being a 
dictatorship, but the country has an excellent track record of keeping their promises 
within business. Singapore has a zero tolerance policy of corruption and is very clear 
on this point.  
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Mr. Wahlstrøm (2009 [interview]) did admit that bureaucracy was not evaluated as an 
independent factor, but it was taken into consideration because of how it would affect 
the project‟s completion time. REC collected a lot of information about the 
bureaucracy by doing interviews with other companies, for example of the time span 
for necessary permits etc. The Economic Development Board (EDB) functioned as 
REC‟s long arm into the bureaucracy and was “incredibly efficient” (Wahlstrøm 2009 
[interview]).  EDB arranged all the meetings with the different departments and with 
different ministers, and functioned as facilitator for the negotiations about access to 
land between JTC and the company. REC also follows up EDB through regular 
reporting activity and Wahlstrøm (2009, [interview]) said: “It is easy to deal with the 
EDB, it is a thoroughly regulated system”.  
6.5.3 Jotun 
Corruption is virtually nonexistent in Singapore, something which makes business 
easier and more predictable than in many other Southeast Asian countries (Lunde 
(2009 [interview]). It is a “superefficient” state with a well developed bureaucracy. In 
Singapore, considered a “democratic dictatorship”, it is easy to deal with the system 
because of clear rules and guidelines (Lunde 2009 [interview]). Corruption is probably 
higher in Malaysia. On the other hand, as an international company, Jotun must fulfill 
very strict requirements regarding corruption. Jotun has been in Malaysia since the 
1980s and knows the system, and Malaysia has followed in Singapore‟s footsteps by 
making the bureaucracy easier to handle. However, Malaysia and its Ministry of 
Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) are still behind Singapore and EDB.  
6.5.4 Interpretation 
It is hard to do business if the institutional foundation is not present: a rule of law, 
control of corruption and crime and security of property rights. Singapore may not be a 
democracy, but so far there has not been any reason to believe that the country‟s 
economic institutions are in danger of being misused and dissolved by the government. 
It is a very stable political system, often described as an authoritarian regime. 
Singapore‟s good reputation and track record is fundamental for attracting 
investments, as stressed by all three company representatives. Even though the 
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rankings of these institutional factors varied in the questionnaire, all of the companies 
gave a high score to either or both control of corruption and/or security of investment 
property. In the investment decision process, security of property rights was of 
considerable significance to REC, while control of corruption was of considerable 
significance to Pareto and Jotun. This does not mean that control of corruption had no 
significance to REC, but that other considerations mattered more in the final decision 
process. It is interesting that control of corruption was very important to Pareto; this 
shows that the financial sector is highly dependent on trust and transparency. The 
banks must be comfortable with the financial firms‟ business partners and their home 
countries. Control of corruption was also important to Jotun in Malaysia, but 
Singapore is still ahead of Malaysia; on the Corruption Perception Index Singapore 
occupies 4
th
 place while Malaysia is ranked as number 47 (Transparency International 
2009, Appendix 2).  
 
Porter (2000) calls the institutional structure the quality of the business environment, 
and Dunning (2001) stresses the role of social relational capital as measured by lack of 
crime, bribery, corruption and terrorism. Quah (1993: 320-323) has argued that the 
civil service in Singapore is managed like a private organization in terms of increasing 
productivity and excellence. The bottom line has not been profit-maximization, but to 
minimize corrupt behavior by removing both incentives and opportunities to be 
corrupt. Two elements of this strategy have been to offer competitive pay and to 
recruit selectively. Hveem et al. (2008b) also found that in addition to economic and 
geographical variables, political and institutional variables affect Norwegian FDI. 
Control of corruption had a robust and positive effect on Norwegian FDI in their 
models, while the impact of democracy and rule of law were not as robust. On the 
other hand, these three variables along with labor rights tend to mutually influence 
each other, and it is therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions about causality due to 
multicolinearity (Hveem et al. 2008b). Other empirical studies find that government 
stability and commitment positively affects FDI (Daude and Stein 2007) and that 
corruption negatively affects FDI (Wei 2000, Busse and Hefeker 2006). The 
importance of control of corruption is exemplified through all three companies 
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investigated in this thesis. A system characterized by rule of law, secure property 
rights and little corruption seems to have a positive effect on FDI, in accordance with 
hypotheses VIII.  
 
The bureaucracy is part of the institutional setting and has consequences for company 
strategy. An efficient bureaucracy is a location advantage according to Schatz and 
Venables (2000). Both Jotun and REC ranked an efficient bureaucracy as being of 
considerable importance in Singapore and Malaysia, and all three informants described 
the Singaporean bureaucracy as efficient and easy to deal with. The Economic 
Development Board (EDB) has been critical in attracting FDI to Singapore and is 
regarded as the key to the country‟s industrialization (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 22).  The 
EDB is an entrepreneurial organization with offices in all the major cities of the world, 
its own salary scale and investment fund. It claims to be non-hierarchical with the 
possibility of climbing the career ladder for promising officers. It is described as a 
“one-stop” service to foreign investors that can provide answers and assistance to a 
wide range of problems, for example construction, recruitment, immigration, labor 
relations, factory space, housing for employees, taxation, customs, suppliers, security 
and environment  (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 24).  EDB is perceived as a professional 
organization, and it follows the main pattern of management as described for the civil 
service; high salaries with incentive schemes, recruitment of the best graduates and 
also influence in the upper echelons of the government. It has a powerful influence on 
statutory boards like JTC (responsible for industrial estates), and in certain instances 
the EDB has been known to even run over the JTC (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 27-29). 
 
There has been close ties between the government and the civil service, and the 
efficient bureaucracy in Singapore is a product of history and strategic planning 
(Rodan 2001: 141). This finding is supported by an investigation carried out by Evans 
and Rauch (2000) on the effect of bureaucratic authority structures on facilitating 
economic growth. They develop a “Weberianness Scale” based on meritocratic 
recruitment and the opportunity for rewarding and long-term careers, characteristics 
which fits the bureaucracy in Singapore very well. Not unexpectedly, Singapore 
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receives a high score on this scale, and the “Weberian” characteristics enhance 
prospects for economic growth. The quality of the bureaucracy has an important and 
independent effect on economic growth, and therefore most likely also on FDI. Busse 
and Hefeker (2006) have also found that the quality of the bureaucracy affect FDI. The 
result in this thesis indicates that an efficient bureaucracy has a positive effect on FDI, 
as described in hypotheses IX.   
 
6.6 General Policy 
According to Dunning (1998), the policies of government are yet another factor that 
influences the investment-location decision. The general policy category has been 
widely defined as tax and other government incentives:   
X: Low corporate tax and other cost-reducing government interventions will 
have a positive effect on FDI. 
6.6.1 Pareto 
Mr. Leivdal (2009 [telephone interview]) claimed that it is tax efficient for Pareto to 
do business in Singapore, but, at the same time, the cost of employees is higher than in 
Norway. The company has made a tax exemption deal with the authorities. Mr. 
Leivdal (2009 [telephone interview]) emphasized that the tax level was not the main 
motive for investing in Singapore, it was only one of many elements influencing the 
decision. Pareto would most probably have invested in Singapore even if the tax level 
had been the same as in Norway; business opportunities are viewed as more important 
than low tax rates.  
6.6.2 REC 
Corporate tax in Singapore is 17% compared to 28% in Norway (Wahlstrøm 2009 
[interview], EDB 2009). The government also offers some incentive arrangements. In 
a press release, REC made public that the company had finalized a comprehensive 
support package including incentives and grants on three areas: tax, R&D and process 
improvement and human resource recruitment and training (REC 2007b). Very few of 
the large multinational companies pay corporate tax in Singapore, but tax is also a part 
of a company‟s economic evaluation – Mr. Wahlstrøm (2009 [interview]) said that 
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“tax is not paid of zero profit”. Singapore is not the only country offering these 
incentive packages either. “The incentives are not sufficient in themselves, it is an 
economic factor, but a lot of other conditions need to be present” (Wahlstrøm 2009, 
[interview]). Examples of other conditions are skilled labor, political stability, 
transparency and a high level of R&D.  
6.6.3 Jotun 
Tax was not a very decisive factor to Jotun, neither in Singapore nor in Malaysia 
(Lunde 2009 [interview]). The corporate tax in Singapore is 17%, while it is 26% in 
Malaysia (EDB 2009, MIDA 2009). In addition, Jotun‟s products are, in line with 
rules and regulations, exempted from payment of duties between Singapore and 
Malaysia.  
6.6.4 Interpretation 
Singapore has a relatively low corporate tax of 17% and a wide range of incentives 
and agreements related to tax (Kai-Sun et al. 2001). Only REC ranked advantageous 
tax policies and regulations as being of considerable significance, but during the 
interview it was underlined that many other conditions also need to be present – for 
example skilled labor and political stability. Most TNCs do not pay tax in Singapore, 
as commented upon by REC‟s representative, and both REC and Pareto has done tax 
exemption deals with the Singapore government. However, all of the companies 
seemed to agree that tax rates, also other tax than corporate tax, are automatically part 
of a company‟s evaluation of a location. Tax was not a decisive factor in any of the 
investment decisions, neither in Singapore nor Malaysia. In Jotun‟s case, it is also 
important that the company‟s products are exempted from payments of duties between 
Singapore and Malaysia, which makes transportation back and forth between the two 
countries very easy.  
 
As described in Table 4.1, the Singapore government offers many fiscal incentives to 
attract TNCs, and there are also R&D grants and small company grants available (Kai-
Sun et al. 2001: 27-28). A company may be granted pioneer status, a tax-free status for 
five to 10 years, and post-pioneer status with tax rate at 10% up to 10 more years. The 
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incentives are granted to companies evaluated as qualified, and discretion rests with 
the government.  The tax and subsidy system is becoming increasingly complicated, 
and it is difficult for foreign investors to decide which subsidies they are qualified for 
and which taxes they have to pay (Kai-Sun et al. 2001: 37). In addition the government 
is in need of extra manpower to implement a variety of schemes and to ensure 
compliance. This observation is supported in other empirical studies; tax payments do 
not only depend on average corporate tax, but on the details of the tax system 
(Navaretti et al. 2004, Brainard 1997). Early work reached the conclusion that tax 
differentials had a negligible effect on the pattern of FDI, but recent work, especially 
related to VFDI, suggests that responsiveness to tax has increased (Navaretti et al. 
2004: 139). There is however little consensus on how strong the tax effects really are 
on location decisions. Other factors influencing TNCs‟ investment decisions are driven 
by government expenditure and may also have a significant effect according to 
Navaretti et al. (2004: 246): “There is therefore a trade-off between taxes and the 
public services that the firms feel they get in different locations, and the overall 
efficiency of the government may matter more than just the tax levels”. Tax rates and 
other cost reducing government interventions have had a positive influence on the 
three companies‟ investment decision, but not a very strong one. As exemplified 
clearly through REC, tax and other incentives are only one economic factor of a total 
evaluation including a range of conditions.   
 
6.7 Sector-specific Policy  
Singapore‟s industrial policy was described as moving towards a K-economy; the city-
state is a manufacturing center, a financial hub and a popular location for TNCs‟ 
regional headquarters. There is a very close connection between policy and access to 
knowledge, technology and R&D. These factors reflect the new economic geography 
and the new motives presented in the theory chapter (Krugman 1991, Porter 2000). 
The hypotheses related to sector-specific policy were:  
XI: Sector-specific industry policy will have a positive effect on FDI (in the 
targeted sectors). 
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XII: A high level of R&D in certain sectors, along with other institutions and 
firms (clusters), will have a positive effect on FDI in the relevant sectors. 
6.7.1 Pareto 
Mr. Leivdal (2009 [telephone interview]) had the impression that Singapore is very 
interested in developing the financial sector, that the financial sector is an area of 
commitment. Pareto regarded this as an advantage; the company has the opportunity to 
further develop the financial sector together with the government. In addition, there is 
a large financial environment in Singapore and this has great significance to Pareto. 
All the well-known banks and brokers are present, and the network is much larger than 
in Norway.  
6.7.2 REC 
Mr. Wahlstrøm (2009 [interview]) described Singapore as focusing on a triangle 
strategy of research, development and industry, and this is mirrored in the country‟s 
policy. During the decision process, it was essential for REC to experience 
commitment on behalf of Singapore‟s government. The main contact took place 
through the EDB where representatives from REC participated at various meetings 
with different ministers, the union leader and the prime minister. It was important to 
receive confirmation directly from the top (Wahlstrøm 2009 [interview]).  
 
In Singapore, there is a high level of R&D and competency in general (Wahlstrøm 
2009 [interview]). Even if there is not yet a solar energy industry, the country has a lot 
of favorable conditions. During the process, REC got the impression that the 
Singapore government recognizes the enormous potential of the solar industry. The 
government has already shown their long-term commitment in the biotechnology and 
the semiconductor industry. REC has also been invited to cooperate in this 
development along with the National University of Singapore (NUS), and there has 
been left room for a future opportunity of establishing R&D facilities at REC‟s site.   
6.7.3 Jotun 
Singapore wants to be a hub for R&D in Asia and the government is very interested in 
developing high technology (Lunde 2009 [interview]). Their goal is to keep a high 
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level of knowledge and to be the best in the region.  Jotun is part of the chemical 
cluster in Singapore, but as Mr. Lunde (2009 [interview]) called attention to, this 
cluster consists mainly of oil refineries and services in the chemical sector. Paints are 
not considered „high-tech‟ in Singapore anymore. Still, all the large paint companies 
are present in Singapore, many with production facilities.  
 
The competition is also strong in Malaysia, where many of the international paint 
companies have chosen to establish a local presence (Lunde 2009 [interview]).  The 
authorities in Malaysia want to raise the standard of living through industrial 
development, and the country wants companies that employ a large share of people. 
Jotun could offer just that; employment to many workers through its new production 
facility. In addition, Mr. Lunde (2009 [interview]) noted that Malaysia has a lot of 
manufacturing business and a good understanding of a value chain, and is therefore 
easier to adapt to for Jotun than Singapore is. In Singapore, they are more focused on 
automation processes in the manufacturing industry, and the country has a dominant 
financial and services sector (see Table 4.1 for details of the industrial policy and 
sector composition in Singapore). For Jotun, paint technology is very specialized 
(Lunde 2009 [interview]). A lot of research on paint, mainly decorative paint, is done 
in Malaysia. Jotun has a regional R&D center in Malaysia and the scientists are trained 
in the company‟s environment.  The company also recruits directly from the 
universities, sometimes even sponsoring part of the students‟ education.  
6.7.4 Interpretation 
REC ranked advantageous sector-specific policy as being of considerable significance, 
while Pareto and Jotun ranked it as being of small significance or no significance (see 
Table 6.4). The effect from industrial policy effect is arguably most evident in REC‟s 
case. Singapore does not have a solar energy industry yet, but alternative energy is an 
industry the country has decided to develop
19
. REC‟s representative asserted that 
Singapore had a lot of favorable conditions to support this claim, and the company 
                                              
19
 Another indication of a developing cluster is the Norwegian solar energy company Norsun‟s desicion in March 
2008 to establish a wafer factory in Singapore (Norsun 2009). It is a smaller project than REC‟s with 
investments of $300 million or about NOK 1.9 billion. The factory will employ 300 and start production in 2010. 
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received proof of Singapore‟s commitment on several occasions; REC was actually 
mentioned in two official speeches after the investment decision had been made. The 
first speech was held by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and the other speech by 
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. In the first speech in October 2007 the Prime 
Minister presented the company, the project and REC‟s motives for choosing 
Singapore. In the second speech in February 2008, REC was mentioned along with 
other corporate giants like ExxonMobil, Shell and Novartis (Prime Minister‟s Office 
Singapore 2007 and 2008). The Singapore government‟s goal of creating a solar 
energy industry in the country was yet again confirmed by the managing director of 
the EDB, Ko Kheng Hwa, when commenting upon the Norwegian investment (EDB 
2007):  
 
The REC project will be a 'queen bee' to attract a hive of solar activities to Singapore, 
catapulting the nation into the solar industry world map and accelerate our development of the 
industry. It also reaffirms, once again, that Singapore continues to be highly competitive in 
complex manufacturing activities, especially those that are capital-, skill and innovation-
intensive. 
 
The authorities have identified a wide range of industries to be nurtured, including 
chemicals (mainly petrochemicals) and alternative energy
20
. In REC‟s investment 
process, this commitment through industrial policy had a very positive effect on the 
decision. It was also hinted at future R&D activities, which can be interpreted as a way 
for REC to eventually augment the firm‟s O advantages through locating in a 
developing cluster (Dunning 2001). Singapore‟s sector-specific policy did not matter 
that much to Jotun and Pareto in their decision processes according to the 
questionnaire answers.  
 
While REC is part of an establishment of a new cluster, there are already some 
industry-specific agglomerations and clusters present in Singapore due to visionary 
politicians and bureaucrats. These clusters may have started with industrial policy. 
                                              
20
 It is well worth taking a look at the EDB web pages – they are imbued with industry policy aiming at attracting 
FDI, especially if you look at the industries sections (www.edg.gov.sg).  
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One example is the semiconductor industry which led to a very good access of skilled 
labor for REC, so-called labor pooling, and there may also be instances of better 
access to intermediate inputs and technological spillovers as pointed out by Krugman 
(1991: 36-37). The electronics industry is still the largest industry in the manufacturing 
sector of Singapore, and the two most important products have been semiconductor 
devices and disc drives (Kai-Sun et al. 2001:46-48). The electronics industry was 
developed mainly through FDI, and government subsidies played a critical role in the 
process. For both manufacturing companies, access to knowledge, technology and 
R&D were important in Singapore and Malaysia. Pareto did not consider this to be of 
importance in the questionnaire, but in the interview, the company‟s representative 
underlined the advantage of the large financial environment and network in Singapore. 
In addition to a financial cluster, there is also a chemical cluster in Singapore. This 
chemical cluster is closely connected to petrochemicals and not so much towards the 
paint industry. In Malaysia, there is more focus on the specialized paint industry and 
its requirements within production and research. On the other hand, Singapore‟s strong 
position as a center for regional headquarters is recognized through Jotun‟s decision to 
keep its regional headquarters there.   
 
Economists have long recognized the importance of agglomeration benefits for the 
location of firms, and early contributions concluded that factors like quality of 
infrastructure, degree of industrialization and the level of inward FDI in specific 
sectors had a positive effect on FDI (Navaretti et al. 2004: 147). However, these 
effects are entangled with a tendency to imitate each others‟ locations, so-called 
„herding‟ or „demonstration‟ effects. Barry et al. (2004) conclude that both 
agglomeration economies and demonstration effects are important to FDI. In the 
article, agglomeration effects seem to be more important than demonstration effects 
for firms in high-tech sectors. Additionally, the policy implications of government 
assisted build-ups of agglomerations, and, in attracting a number of companies in a 
certain sector for demonstration purposes are mentioned.  
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Even though Jotun did not consider sector-specific policy as very decisive for the 
investment decision, it seems like Singapore‟s focus on „high-tech‟ industries, had at 
least a small negative effect on Jotun‟s decision, while Malaysia‟s prioritizing of the 
paint industry affected the FDI decision in a positive way. In addition, there was also a 
certain paint industry cluster present in both countries. REC seems to have been 
attracted by the future agglomeration effects, while all the companies may also have 
been affected by demonstration effects. There are at least 130 Norwegian companies 
present in Singapore. My argument is that the two hypotheses concerning sector-
specific industry and access to R&D and clusters have shown to positively influence 
FDI, and, the study indicates that industrial policy and the presence of clusters are 
highly interconnected.  
 
6.8 Review of the Results  
The above discussion of the interview data and the questionnaire paints a complex 
picture of all the assessments and evaluations involved in the three investment 
decisions. My research question was made up of two parts: the identification of 
economic and political factors considered important for Norwegian investments 
abroad, and the identification of the most decisive factors in the process towards 
choosing Singapore. Table 6.5 sums up the results for the twelve hypotheses presented 
in the theory chapter, to indicate which factors were important to the firms‟ investment 
decisions in Singapore and Malaysia.  
 
Most of the economic factors had a positive effect on the investment decisions, as 
expected based on theory and supported by other empirical results. The two exceptions 
were the union system and the level of investment, where the results were very 
indecisive. A stabile system with clear rule and regulations, an efficient bureaucracy, 
sector-specific policy and clusters also had a positive effect on the FDI decisions. It is 
hard to say anything about the strength and robustness of the findings in a case study, 
but the results are in agreement with earlier empirical research on Norwegian FDI and 
with research on FDI in general.    
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Table 6.5: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Category Number Hypotheses Results 
Economic 
Factors 
I 
A large market size will have a 
positive effect on FDI. 
Market size had a positive effect, 
especially to Pareto and Jotun.  
Economic 
Factors 
II 
A highly educated work force will 
have a positive effect on FDI. 
Access to skilled workers had a 
positive effect, especially to REC 
and Jotun.  
Economic 
Factors 
III 
Low wages will have a positive 
effect on FDI. 
Relatively low wages had a 
positive effect, especially to REC 
and Jotun.  
Economic 
Factors 
IV 
A highly unionized work force 
will have a negative impact on 
FDI. 
Indecisive results. The unions in 
Singapore are tightly controlled by 
the government.  
Economic 
Factors 
V 
Access to suppliers will have a 
positive effect on FDI. 
Access to suppliers had a positive 
effect, especially to REC and 
Jotun.  
Economic 
Factors 
VI 
A high level of investment will 
have a negative effect on FDI.  
Indecisive results. Cluster effects 
may be of more importance than 
the negative effect of a high 
investment level.  
Economic 
Factors 
VII 
A well developed infrastructure 
will have a positive effect on FDI. 
A well developed infrastructure 
had an overall positive effect on all 
three companies.  
Economic 
Institutions 
VIII 
A system characterized by 
enforcement of property rights, 
rule of law and of control of 
corruption and crime will have a 
positive effect on FDI. 
A stable political system had a 
positive effect; REC emphasized 
the enforcement property rights, 
and Jotun and Pareto stressed the 
significance of control of 
corruption.  
Economic 
Institutions 
IX 
An efficient bureaucracy will 
have a positive effect on FDI. 
An efficient bureaucracy had a 
positive effect, especially to REC 
and Jotun.  
General 
Policy 
 
X 
Low corporate tax and other cost-
reducing government 
interventions will have a positive 
effect on FDI. 
Had a positive effect on all three 
companies, but not very important 
for the investment decisions.  
Sector-
specific 
Policy 
XI 
Sector-specific industrial policy 
will have a positive effect on FDI 
(in the targeted sectors).  
Industrial policy had a positive 
effect on REC in Singapore and 
also a positive effect on Jotun in 
Malaysia.  
Sector-
specific 
Policy 
XII 
A high level of R&D in certain 
sectors, along with other 
institutions and firms (clusters), 
will have a positive effect on FDI 
in the relevant sectors. 
Had a positive effect on all three 
companies. 
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The second part of the research question focused on identifying the decisive factors for 
each company. As previously described in the questionnaire section, Pareto and 
Jotun‟s main motive was access to market, while REC‟s motive was more asset-
oriented. Pareto wanted to develop more business in both Singapore and Asia, and 
Singapore‟s strict control of corruption contributed to the decision of establishing an 
affiliate. REC‟s decision was based on a combination of factors; access to skilled 
labor, cost savings and a well developed infrastructure. In addition, the government‟s 
focus on R&D and the solar energy industry, tipped the scale in favor of choosing 
Singapore. Jotun‟s main motive for investing in Singapore in the 1970s was to gain 
access to the regional market. The primary motive for choosing Malaysia as the new 
production site in 2008 was due to the large national market, but also because of 
improved access to land, access to skilled and lower-cost labor (lower cost than in 
Singapore) and the cost savings effect of a large production facility compared to 
having two smaller plants. In Jotun‟s case it seems like the prediction about Malaysia‟s 
challenge of Singapore as a new offshore manufacturing site for TNCs may be correct 
(Kai-Sun et al. 2001). At the same time, Jotun has decided to keep its regional 
headquarters in Singapore.    
 
In the FDI literature, chemical products have been identified as a typical industry for 
Norwegian FDI, an area where Norwegian TNCs are particularly dominant (Grünfeld 
2005: 12, Selfors 1999: 53). Contrary to chemicals, the Norwegian finance sector‟s 
share of outward investments has been very small and the solar energy industry is a 
new area of business that has yet to be explored. What do these three companies have 
in common? Besides being Norwegian, following the overall Norwegian pattern of 
FDI and sharing some of the same motives? According to Porter (1990), there are 
national attributes that foster competitive advantage in particular industries, or what 
Dunning (2001) termed country-specific differences in the O (ownership) advantages 
of firms. Jotun is a manufacturer of paint where both marine coatings to protect vessels 
and protective coatings, often used on offshore structures and energy installations, 
make up over half of the company‟s business segment (Jotun 2009b). Norway has a 
long history within the shipping and energy (hydro power and oil and gas) business.  
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Pareto, operating in the financial sector, has specialized in businesses and industries 
were Norway has „particular advantage‟ as defined by the company‟s goal – like 
offshore and shipping
21
. There are certain connections, but what about REC? The solar 
energy industry is a high technological industry, but, it shares a common characteristic 
with a traditional sector in Norway: energy. It might not be oil or water, but it is still 
energy-related. Clearly, home country influences firms‟ O advantages.  
 
When a firm possesses exclusive O advantages and it is beneficial for the company 
itself to make use of these (internalization advantages), it will seek to use the O and I 
advantages in combination with location advantages of other countries (Dunning 1988: 
25). Recent statistics from 1998-2006 indicate that Singapore has important location 
advantages to offer Norwegian firms. The location advantages include access to 
markets or different types of assets, as shown in the analysis. In addition, it seems like 
Singapore is functioning as an Asian financial center for Norwegian companies. As 
Gisnås (1995: 161) remarked already in the mid 1990s, Norwegian companies have 
used Singapore as a gateway into South and Southeast Asia, and the country may also 
be a gateway to the future. So far, the data corresponds with Gisnås‟ observation.   
  
                                              
21
 Imarex, my other candidate in the financial sector, is based on the freight derivatives market and have 
managed to build leading positions in two core markets – shipping and energy. http://www.imarex.com/ 
89 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary 
It is time to gather the threads and take a quick recapitulation before putting the results 
in perspective. The research question was:  
 
Which economic and political factors do Norwegian companies regard as important 
when investing abroad, and to what degree have they been deciding in the process of 
choosing Singapore as the investment location?  
 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm comprises ownership-specific advantages, location-
specific advantages and internalization advantages. The paradigm was used as a 
framework for analyzing the location-specific factors and how these affect Norwegian 
FDI.  The general pattern of Norwegian FDI to Singapore was investigated by using 
statistics from SSB (Statistics Norway) containing information on Norwegian 
investments to Singapore in the period 1998-2006. Interviews and questionnaires were 
used to collect data at the firm-level. I analyzed the investment decisions of three 
companies: Pareto Securities, Renewable Energy Corporation and Jotun, operating 
within financial services, the solar energy industry and the chemicals industry, 
respectively.  
 
The value of Norwegian FDI stocks in Singapore has increased significantly from 
1998 to 2006. The four largest investment sectors in Singapore are oil and gas 
extraction and affiliated services, manufacture of paper and paper products and 
publishing, shipping, and post and telecommunications and computer and related 
activities, following the typical sector pattern of Norwegian FDI. These four sectors 
accounted for 88% of total investments during the period in question. The largest 
problem with the statistics is that as a financial center, Singapore often functions as a 
transshipment country for capital. The small city-state receives over half of all 
Norwegian FDI to Asia, and most probably not all of the capital remains within the 
country‟s boundaries. It is suggested that Singapore may be conceived as a gateway to 
Asia for Norwegian FDI.  
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To answer the question about which location factors were important to Norwegian 
companies when investing abroad, 12 hypotheses were suggested on the basis of 
theory, divided into four categories: economic factors, economic institutions, general 
policy and sector-specific policy. Of the economic factors, access to new markets, an 
educated work force, low wages, access to suppliers and a well developed 
infrastructure were found to have a positive effect on the investment decisions of the 
three companies investigated. The data on the union system and the high level of 
investment in Singapore were inconclusive; it is hard to tell if it had a positive or a 
negative effect on the companies‟ investment decisions. The economic institutions, 
defined as  a system characterized by enforcement of property rights, rule of law and 
control of corruption together with an efficient bureaucracy had a positive influence on 
Norwegian FDI. General policy like tax and customs was also found to attract 
Norwegian FDI, though not very important – it was considered „the icing on the cake‟ 
by the companies. Last but not least, sector specific policy along with clusters had a 
positive effect on the investment decisions, and these two factors were also found to be 
highly interconnected.  
 
All three investments are horizontal investments, made to establish a new office or a 
new production plant abroad. The three companies considered many of the same 
factors to be important, but the decisive factors for each company varied. The 
investments of Pareto and Jotun were overall market oriented, while REC‟s investment 
decision was mainly asset oriented. In addition to access to skilled labor, another 
significant motive to REC was cost savings. These two factors were also important to 
the other manufacturing company Jotun, combined with access to the national market 
in Malaysia. The most decisive factors to Pareto were market access and the control of 
corruption. Norwegian investments have been characterized by market orientation and 
greenfield projects, and these three firms are no exception. At the same time, REC 
shows that even if asset orientation is more common within vertical FDI, it may also 
be a motive for horizontal FDI. The results indicate that in addition to the economic 
factors, economic institutions and policy influence Norwegian FDI.  
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The above results describe a complex picture; some factors are regarded as decisive, 
some as important and others are more sector- and industry-specific, even firm-
specific. When balancing risk and profit, two out of the three firms decided to invest in 
Singapore. Jotun is still keeping an office and a warehouse in Singapore, but decided 
to move production to Malaysia. Singapore might experience increased competition 
from Malaysia when trying to attract manufacturing industry in the future.  
 
7.2 Widening the Perspective  
My focus throughout this thesis has been the relationship between firm and host 
country. Dunning (2001: 176) has argued that his paradigm does not work as a 
predictive theory of TNCs, but as a framework for analyzing the determinants of 
international production. The host country has certain location advantages, but on the 
other hand, the home country influences the ability of its firms to succeed in particular 
industries; there are country-specific differences in the ownership advantages of firms 
from different countries (Porter 1990, Dunning 2001: 176). Thus, there may be 
interaction effect between home and host country. It is possible to discern a certain 
Norwegian niche strategy, and its foundation can be found in the Norwegian transport 
and energy sector. The niche strategy identified here is based on industries like oil and 
gas, offshore and shipping, sizeable industries also in Singapore.  
 
Dunning‟s Investment Development Path (2001) describes how structural change is 
connected to FDI patterns as countries pass through several stages of development. 
The OLI configuration is constantly changing and therefore affecting FDI. Norway‟s 
outward investment is now larger than inward FDI. Singapore has an even larger 
amount of inward FDI than Norway, but is starting to invest abroad increasingly. The 
role of the government in attracting FDI has been described as crucial (Lall 1996). 
This is especially apparent in Singapore Inc. where the government together with a 
professional and efficient bureaucracy has managed the country in a very corporate 
style, combining political and social policies with an effective political paternalism. 
The result was an impressive mobilization of resources which led to rapid growth and 
development.  
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7.3 Where Do We Go from Here?  
The purpose with the thesis was to contribute to the research on FDI, particularly to 
the case of Norwegian FDI due to its large increase the last decade. As a follow-up, it 
would be interesting to see if these findings are valid on a larger scale by for example 
conducting a survey about companies‟ FDI motives, or through case studies on other 
host countries. In Norway, some of the largest companies are state owned, but do they 
have the same motives as privately owned companies, and, which location advantages 
do they consider important? Privately owned companies seem to value political 
stability and transparency, but do state owned companies share this view? Already, 
results indicate that state owned enterprises tend to invest relatively more in countries 
with poor rule of law and property rights protection than privately owned enterprises 
(Hveem et al. 2009). Another exciting trend is the emergence of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds where Norway‟s Government Pension Fund is considered the gold standard. 
These funds‟ acquisitions are normally portfolio investments, and accountability and 
transparency are of great concern to Norway‟s fund. Are they succeeding? The 
questions are many for future research.  
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9. Appendix 
APPENDIX 1: Singapore and Norway 
 
 
 
Singapore Norway 
Area 692.7sq km 323,802sq km 
Population 4,657,542 4,660,539 
Language 
English (Language of 
administration), Mandarin, Malay 
(National Language) & Tamil 
Bokmal Norwegian (official), Nynorsk 
Norwegian (official), small Sami- and 
Finnish-speaking minorities 
Ethnic groups 
Chinese 76.8%, Malay 13.9%, 
Indian 7.9%, other 1.4% (2000 
census) 
Norwegian 94.4% (includes Sami, 
about 60,000), other European 3.6%, 
other 2% (2007 estimate) 
Literacy 92.5% 100% 
GDP per capita (PPP) $ 52,000 $ 55,200 
Inward FDI (stock) $ 225.7 billion $ 69.04 billion 
Outward FDI (stock) $ 142.4 billion $ 142.3 billion 
Education 
expenditures of GDP 
3.7% 7.2% 
Birth rate (per 1000 
population) 
8.99 11.12 
Government type Parliamentary republic Constitutional monarchy 
Freedom house* Partly free Free 
Freedom House 
Political Rights* 
5 1 
Freedom House Civil 
Liberties* 
4 1 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(rank, score)** 
4
th
, 9.2 14
th
, 7.9 
Gini Index 
(distribution of family 
income) 
48.1 25 
Human Development 
Index (rank, 
score)*** 
25
th
, 0.922 2
nd
 , 0.968 
The Gini Index measures inequality where 0 means absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality. 
All information is from the CIA Factbook except for (CIA 2009):  
* Freedom House, scale 1-7, 1 is most free and 7 the least free rating 2009).  
** Transparency International, CPI, scale 0-10 where 0 is highly corrupt and 10 highly clean (2009).  
*** Human Development Report 2007/2008, scale 0-100 where 100 is the highest rating (UNDP 
2009).    
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APPENDIX 2: Singapore and Malaysia 
 
 
 
Singapore Malaysia 
Area 
692.7 sq km 329,750 sq km 
Population 4,657,542 25,715,819 
Language 
English (Language of 
administration), Mandarin, 
Malay (National Language) & 
Tamil 
Bahasa Malaysia (official), 
English, Chinese (Cantonese, 
Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, 
Hainan, Foochow), Tamil, 
Telugu, Malayalam, Panjabi, 
Thai and several indigenous 
languages 
Ethnic groups Chinese 76.8%, Malay 13.9%, 
Indian 7.9%, other 1.4% (2000 
census) 
Malay 50.4%, Chinese 23.7%, 
indigenous 11%, Indian 7.1%, 
others 7.8% (2004 est.) 
Literacy 
92.5 percent 88.7% 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
$ 52,000 $ 15,300 
Inward FDI (stock) 
$ 225.7 billion $ 92.76 billion 
Outward FDI (stock) 
$ 142.4 billion $ 50.08 billion 
Education expenditures of GDP 
3.7%  6.2% 
Birth rate (per 1000 population) 
8.99 22.44 
Government type 
Parliamentary republic Constitutional monarchy 
Freedom house* 
Partly free Partly free 
Freedom House Political 
Rights* 
5 4 
Freedom House Civil Liberties* 
4 4 
Corruption Perception Index** 
(rank, score) 
4
th
, 9.2 47
th
, 5.1 
Gini Index (distribution of 
family income) 
48.1 46.1 
Human Development Index 
(rank, score)*** 
25
th
, 0.922 63
rd
, 0.811 
The Gini Index measures inequality where 0 means absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality. 
All information is from the CIA Factbook except for (CIA 2009):  
* Freedom House, scale 1-7, 1 is most free and 7 the least free rating 2009).  
** Transparency International, CPI, scale 0-10 where 0 is highly corrupt and 10 highly clean (2009).  
*** Human Development Report 2007/2008, scale 0-100 where 100 is the highest rating (UNDP 
2009).    
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APPENDIX 3: Presentation of Key Informants 
 
 
Pareto:  
Per Didrik Leivdal started working for Pareto in 1996 as a financial analyst. In 2002 he 
proceeded to work with corporate finance, or financial counseling. He was the initiator 
and main driving force behind Pareto‟s decision to invest in Singapore in early 2006. 
Since then he has been based in Singapore and is now CEO of Pareto Securities Asia.  
 
REC:  
Einar Wahlstrøm has worked for REC the last eight years, since the company only had 
a staff of four or five persons. In recent years he has been working with business 
developments for various projects and has become responsible for early phase or phase 
I development. This means that Einar Wahlstrøm is responsible for choosing 
localization for new facilities, and he was head of the process of choosing Singapore 
during 2007.  
 
Jotun:  
Terje Lunde presently works in Jotun‟s Business Development Department. He started 
his career in Jotun in 1971 as a chemistry engineer, and has worked in almost all areas 
of the company‟s operations – in the laboratory, with technology service and with 
marketing, sales and HR. Terje Lunde has been stationed abroad several times; he 
returned to Norway only three years ago after leading the establishment of Jotun in 
Indonesia. With his extensive experience and as a previous member of Group 
Management, he has a good knowledge and overview of the company and its business 
strategy.  
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APPENDIX 4: Interview Guide 
 
Presentation and explanation about the thesis, the interview and the use of information. 
Refer to questionnaire and explain the “road map” for the interview.  
 
I. General information about the company and the investment 
1. How long have you been working for the company? What is your job title? 
Previous jobs in the same company?  
2. What kind of products/services do you offer? Who are your customers?   
3. Who owns the company? How is the ownership structure?   
4. When did you begin to consider operations in Asia? Only Asia or other parts of 
the world?  
5. Who was involved in the decision making process? Number of people?  
6. Concerning the investment decision… 
a. Which locations did you consider?  
b. Why not some of these others locations (c)?  
c. Why did you choose Singapore (main reason)? 
7. When was the final decision made?  
a. When did operations begin in Singapore? Size of the investment? 
b. How many employees – when operations started and later?   
 
II. Economic factors 
1. Market size (access to customers)  
a. National market 
b. Regional market 
2. Labor 
a. Norwegians or locals? Why, education and knowledge?  
b. If Norwegians – is the standard of living satisfying? Was this a part of 
the assessment? 
c. Salaries? Same/higher/lower than in Norway?  
d. Labor laws and unions? How does this work in Singapore? 
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3. Input prices – low cost or expensive?  Access to suppliers?  
4. Investments in general (more for Pareto) 
Did the company think about the general investment level? That there are many 
who invest in Singapore? Related to customers?  
5. Infrastructure – important for the investment decision?   
a. Transport and communication 
b. Access to offices and/or land. Cheap or expensive? State owned or 
private owned?  
 
III. Economic institutions 
1. Corruption and crime 
Any thoughts? Important for the investment decision?  
2. Property rights 
Security of investment property to expropriation and property related crime – 
important for investing? Why/why not?  
3. Bureaucracy 
a. What sort of an impression do you have of Singapore‟s bureaucracy?  
b. What kind of contact/communication has the company had with the 
bureaucracy? The Economic Development Board (EDB)? Other agencies?  
c. Was dealing with the bureaucracy considered a major cost?  
 
IV. Policy – general and sector-specific 
1. General policy  
a. Taxes and duties, important in the investment decision?  
b. How are taxes and duties compared to Norway? Compared to other 
countries in Asia? 
c. Financial assistance? 
d. Other incentives?  
2. Sector-specific/Industry policy 
a. Impression of industry policy? Specifically for your industry?  
b. Was this taken into consideration in the investment decision?   
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3. ”Clusters” 
a. Not just customers, but also cooperative partners? Networks and 
business contacts?  
b. A large industry cluster (finance, renewable energy or paint)? Did this 
matter for the decision?  
c. Access to technology and research?  
4. Politics 
a. Did the company have any direct contact with politicians?   
b. Impression of policy to attract investment? Effective?   
 
V. Concluding 
1. The most important reasons/factors for investing in Singapore – summing up + 
what is the most important for the company in terms of: 
a. Economic factors 
b. Political factors 
c. Other reasons not mentioned? (language, society, culture…)  
 
 
 Thank you for the interview!  
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APPENDIX 5: Questionnaire 
 
Please answer in English or Norwegian.  
 
1. Name of the company?  
 
 
2. What is your position/title in the company? 
 
 
 
 
3. What was your role in the process towards an investment decision in Singapore?  
 
 
 
 
 
4. What were the company‟s main motives behind the investment decision? Mention one 
or several, preferably in ranking order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. On a scale from 0 – 4, which of these conditions in Singapore have been of 
significance for deciding to invest? Just put an “X” in the right box.  
 
 
 
 
 
Access to national market 
 
 
Access to regional market 
 
 
Access to suppliers 
and/or cooperative partners 
 
 
Access to lower-cost labor 
 
0= no  
signific. 
2= some  
signific. 
3=  
considerable 
signific. 
4= great 
signific. 
    
    
    
1= small  
signific. 
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On a scale from 0 – 4, which of these conditions in Singapore have been of 
significance for deciding to invest? Just put an “X” in the right box.  
 
 
 
 
 
Access to skilled labor 
 
 
Access to lower-cost inputs 
 
 
High quality infrastructure 
(transport and communication) 
 
 
Advantageous tax policy 
and regulations 
 
 
Advantageous sector-specific 
policies 
 
 
Access to knowledge,  
technology and R&D 
 
 
Control of corruption 
 
 
Security of investment 
property to expropriation 
and property related crime 
 
 
Bureaucratic efficiency 
 
 
Regulatory ease of establishing  
operations in Singapore 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
0= no  
signific. 
2= some  
signific. 
3=  
considerable 
signific. 
4= great 
signific. 
1= small  
signific. 
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6.  How would you describe the general climate for doing business in Singapore (when 
compared to other countries in the region and when compared to countries in other 
regions)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Other comments – motives that have not been mentioned, considerations about 
Singapore etc. (feel free to use the other side of the page if necessary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for participating!
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